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On March 30, 1995, newspaper headlines declared that hate
speech regulations were dead. After six years of litigating over university hate speech codes,2 Stanford University's rule, one of the most
modest and cautiously drafted, had been declared unconstitutional by
a California Superior Court.

• Visiting Scholar, Institute of Governmental Studies, Univrsity of California, Berkeley. Ph.D., 1999, University of Chicago; M.P.P., 1989, and J.D., 1989, cum laude,
Harvard University; A.B., 1985, with highest distinction, University of Michigan. The
author would like to thank Nancy Crowe, Robert Post, Jennifer Rexroat, Gerry Rosenberg, Kim Scheppele, and Ann Springer for their helpful comments and
criticisms, as well as the DukeJournalof Gender, Law & Policy for the opportunity to
test some of this material at an earlier symposium.

1. See, e.g., Thought Police Disarmed: Campus Speech Codes R.LP., Aviz. REPuB., Mar.
30, 1995, at B4 [hereinafter Thought Police Disarmed];Another Code Bites the Dust,
2.

RocKY MTN. NEws, Apr. 7, 1995, at 69A [hereinafterAnother Code].
Throughout this Article I will be referring to "hate speech codes." In truth, I mean

3.

university regulations that punish discriminatory conduct, covering speech and/or action. In fact, as will be suggested later, the courts may have labeled regulations as
covering speech in order to try to distinguish thqm from sexual harassment laws.
See Cony v. Stanford Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. filed Feb. 27, 1995).
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In the wake of the Stanford decision, many commentators rejoiced. Nat Hentoff, a long-time critic of hate speech codes, hailed the

end of a doctrine that had suffered from "fundamental weakness [es].'
The Arizona Republic delighted that "the First Amendment has been
reinstated on America's college campuses,"5 and the Rocky Mountain
News opined that hate speech codes were now "dead lettersunenforced law."6
But such celebrating aside, hate speech regulation is far from over.
To the contrary, hate speech rules not only continue to exist, but the
courts regularly enforce their provisions. The difference is that these
cases are largely restricted to a single category-sexual harassment.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and with the regulatory support of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), U.S. courts are willing to penalize those who verbally harass
others on the basis of their sex.7
That the courts appear to have conflicting approaches to different
classes of hate speech begs the question of why this disparity exists.
Why is it that courts bristle at university hate speech codes but allow
other cases to go forward protecting women from harassing speech?
A logical first step would be to address the various court opinions
on the subject, and to be sure many a judge has tried to justify the distinction between hate speech codes and sexual harassment law based
on the different environments in which they each arise. This distinction has also caught the attention of several legal scholars, most of
whom accept the notion that sexual harassment law can be distinguished from hate speech policies. As a group, they either agree with
the courts that the rules of the workplace (sexual harassment) are inapplicable to the classroom (hate speech), or they argue that sexual
harassment law should be limited to conduct and that any sort of verbal harassment, no matter its basis or target, violates the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.8
4. Nat Hentoff, Against the Odds: A HistoricFree Speech Victory, VILLAGE VOICE, May
2, 1995, at 20.

5. Thought Police Disarmed,supranote 1, at B4.
6. Another Code, supra note 1, at 69A.
7. Bmatmu LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KAD E, SExuAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
LAw 10 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-EnvironmentHarassment
and the FirstAmendment,52 OHIo ST. LJ.481 (1991); Cynthia L. Esdund, Freedom
ofExpression in the Workplace andthe Problem of DiscriminatoryHarassment,75 Tax.
L. REv. 688 (1997).
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This Article challenges those assumptions, arguing that we need to
rethink the courts' treatment of sexual harassment law and hate speech
codes. Contrary to many commentators, I reject the notion that sexual
harassment law is easily distinguished from hate speech codes or that
the courts have done an adequate job of explaining their divergent decisions. If anything, the courts have been unusually silent on the
question, and those that have considered the issue often leave us with
conflicting opinions. Indeed, this riddle is what makes the judicial
treatment of hate speech so interesting. Because the courts have been
unclear in their justifications, we need to work harder to uncover their
true motivations and explanations. This Article tries to do just that,
eventually concluding that social and political theories do more to ex-

plain the courts' behavior than do jurisprudential answers. One of the
Article's majors conclusions is that the courts' different treatment of
sexual harassment and hate speech stems from their divergent views of
gender and racial protection, and ultimately in the American public's
conflicting attitudes towards women's and minorities' rights.
In making this argument, the Article is divided into four sections.
It begins by comparing collegiate hate speech codes to the hostile work
environment test of sexual harassment law. Examining both their textual similarities as well as the historical intentions of their authors, I
argue that the two are essentially the same-motivated by similar concerns and addressed to comparable offenses. The Article then moves to
the cases themselves. I compare the courts' treatment of collegiate
speech policies and sexual harassment law, concluding that the courts
have treated similar claims differently; even when cases involve primarily verbal harassment, sexual harassment prevails. By contrast, each
of the courts that has considered collegiate hate speech codes has invalidated them as unconstitutional.

Given these divergent decisions, the Article considers whether the
courts' purported explanations support their decisions or whether
other arguments exist that sufficiently explain the divergence between
sexual harassment law and hate speech codes. This is a substantial portion of the Article where I consider four explanations: 1) that rules
from the workplace are inapplicable to the academic setting; 2) that

"academic freedom" in some way exempts the classroom from rules
against verbal harassment; 3) that universities may have overstepped

their own hate speech policies; and 4) that sexual harassment law is
limited to conduct but that hate speech codes overreach into speech.
Ultimately, I conclude that no single argument sufficiently explains the
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courts' divergent treatment between the two areas of law. Therefore,
the distinction between hate speech codes and sexual harassment law
cannot be defended on jurisprudential grounds.
In the second part I propose four other explanations that better
depict the courts' behavior. Drawing on several works from political
science, I argue that the courts' decisions were a response to unique
social and political pressures, and that more particularly, the hate
speech decisions were intended as a clear message against certain kinds
of cultural change. The explanations are somewhat varied, at times
suggesting that courts are responsive to organized pressure groups and
the power of public opinion, and at other points arguing that judges
may seek to impose their own cultural and social beliefs, whether
about gender and minority rights or even public displays of sexuality.
However, they each reflect a larger theme of this Article: that the dichotomy between sexual harassment and hate speech cases represents
the work of a political institution. This is not the same as saying judges
are partisan activists, seeking to impose their ideological agendas much
like legislators or executives would do. But to see courts as dispassionate observers sitting on high is to miss the substance of what they do
and to ignore the power of their influence. Courts face political pressures, and judges, whether explicitly or not, often make the same type
of balancing decisions that politicians confront each day. Indeed, it is
their very political nature that best explains the courts' peculiar distinction between sexual harassment law and hate speech codes.
I.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW AND CAMPUS SPEECH CODES

While now well established in the law, sexual harassment was not
always so widely recognized by the courts. In fact, rather than enjoying
direct statutory support, the tort of sexual harassment developed out of
the larger doctrine of unfair employment practices. Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are prohibited from
"discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his ... condi-

tions or privileges of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. "' Originally, this language was
used to bring suits challenging wages and promotions, but over time
courts began to recognize that harassment could become "so severe and

9.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
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pervasive that it affects the conditions of employment" and thus violates Title VII's prohibition of workplace discrimination.' °
The initial wave of lawsuits under Title VII challenged racial harassment," but today both the courts and the EEOC recognize that
Title VII supports claims for unfair harassment on the basis of race,
sex, religion,, or national origin.' 2 This is not to say that the caseload is
so varied, for the vast majority of harassment claims are those alleging
sexual misconduct. In fact, "harassment" today has widely come to
mean sexual harassment. The courts have become accustomed to seeing mainly sexual, not racial harassment cases;' 3 and even the EEOC,
while noting that harassment cases may cover race and other bases, has
drafted regulations dedicated solely to sexual harassment."
Sexual harassment has two bases, quidpro quo harassment and the
creation of a hostile, intimidating, or offensive workplace. The former
generally covers sexual advances or requests for sexual favors when presented as a condition of employment. It is hostile workplace
harassment, however, that is most relevant to this Article. Not only
does it potentially involve the First Amendment, but most university
hate speech codes were modeled on its provisions.

The tort of hostile workplace harassment has five elements:
*

Verbal or physical conduct of a sexual or sex-based nature;

*

That is unwelcome;

*

That is directed against an individual because of her (or

his) sex;
"

That has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an

intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment;

10. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 7, at 10.

11. The numbers were so great that one commentator has called Title VII's first years "a
substantive law on blacks." CATHARNE MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN 127 (1979).
12. See LINDEMANN & KADuE, supra note 7, at 9. In a footnote to its regulation at 29
C.F.RL § 1604.11 (1998), the EEOC declares that the "principles [of harassment
law] continue to apply to race, color, religion or national origin" in addition to sex.
13. See LINDEMA.NN & KADUE, supra note 7, at 9-10, 30-31; Susan Estrich, Sex at Work,
43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 816-23 (1991).
14. 29 C.F.IL § 1604.11 (1998).

MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW

[Vol. 6:153

And that an employer knew or should have known of
and did not take adequate action to stop or prevent."
When compared to the terms of the hostile work environment
doctrine (HWE), 6 campus speech codes look remarkably similar. This
resemblance should not be surprising, since many authors of the codes
borrowed quite deliberately from the law of sexual harassment. 17 According to one source, 137 colleges and universities adopted speech
codes between 1986 and 1991.18 Although not all were based on
HWE, three of the four codes that made it to court had distinct similarities to sexual harassment law. For example, the University of
Michigan's policy sanctioned individuals for "discriminatory harassment" if they engaged in:
* Verbal or physical behavior;
• That stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis
of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed,
national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap,
or Vietnam-era veteran status;
•

*

And that creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning
environment for educational pursuits, employment, or

participation in university-sponsored extracurricular ac• •• 19
tivities."
So, too, the University of Wisconsin's discriminatory harassment
policy had four elements:2"

•

Racist or discriminatory comments, epithets, or other

°

expressive behavior;
Directed at an individual, or on separate occasions at
different individuals;

15. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998).
16. For the remainder of this paper, the claim of sexual harassment based on a hostile,
intimidating, or offensive work environment will be abbreviated as "HWE."
17. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name Calling, in WoRDs THAT WOUND: CRTICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTrvE SPEECH, AND THE Fmisr AMENDMENT 89 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds.,
1993).

18. Academic Index, LINGUA FRANCA, Oct. 1991, at 5.
19. Both these terms, and the terms for the University of Wisconsin's code that follows,
are paraphrased. For the exact wording of each code, consult Doe v. University of
Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989) and UWM Post v. Board ofRegents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165-66 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
20. See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856.
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That intentionally demean the race, sex, religion, color,
creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry, or age of the individual or individuals;
* And that create an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning
environment for education, university-related work, or
other university-authorized activity.
When viewed side-by-side like this, collegiate hate speech codes
share four essential characteristics with HWE claims. First, both the
codes and sexual harassment law were designed to cover protected
groups of individuals. Sexual harassment law has usually been applied
to protect women, while hate speech codes were expanded to cover
race, religion, color, and other identity groupings. Second, both the
codes and sexual harassment law covered unwelcome verbal or physical
conduct. Although the hate speech codes did not use the term
"unwelcome" explicitly, their requirement that the conduct demean or
stigmatize another presumes that an attack would be unwelcome.
Third, both standards required that an attack be targeted at an individual's protected identity. It would not be enough, for example, that
an employee used sexual invectives at work. To trigger sexual harassment law, such epithets would have to be targeted against a woman
because of her gender. Similarly, in the university setting, an epithet
would have to be directed against an individual's race, color, or other
"

protected characteristic. Finally, the hate speech codes used the exact
same standard as HWE for triggering liability. Although occurring in

an educational setting and not just at work, the requirement that conduct create an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for
pursuits is taken completely from the law of sexual hareducational
22
assment.

21. To understand what it means to target a woman "because of her gender" can be difficult. Essentially, this expression means that the harasser singles out his victim because
she is female. As cases ofsame-sex harassment arise, this definition may be broadened.
For the purposes of this Article, however, I will consider sexual harassment to mean
that a woman receives unwelcome sexual conduct that she would not if she were
male.

22. There is one obvious dissimilarity between the codes and HWE. While the former
holds individuals directly liable for creating a hostile educational environment, HWE
essentially creates vicarious liability against employers for the acts of their employees.
Some commentators consider this distinction significant, arguing that speech codes
expand liability past anything allowed in the workplace. However, the argument runs
the other way. Speech codes actually limit liability, holding liable only those indi-
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One reason for the similarities between HWE and speech codes is
that both were targeted to the same type of harm. As commentators
have noted, the law of HWE was directed against the "kinds of prejudice and stereotyped thinking" that treat women as one-dimensional
sex objects.23 As women have become more equal partners in the
workplace and classroom, the consequences of sexual harassment are
both personally and professionally debilitating. Recent studies indicate
that a clear majority of women experience physical harassment on the
job, with nearly two-thirds of women reporting that they have faied
verbal harassment at work.24 Nor are these small slights that can simply
be sloughed off. Studies have shown that between forty-five and seventy-five percent of sexual harassment victims "experience [an] adverse
effect on their work performance." 2 Victims "frequently are angry,
embarrassed, fearful, and anxious about the incidents.... [T]hey feel
less trustfil, have problems in their ... work, and develop negative

attitudes toward career development." 26 In the most severe cases of
sexual harassment, victims may suffer headaches, sleeplessness, fatigue,
gastrointestinal problems, and appetite loss. Some "experience significant disruption in their relationships with their boyfriends. or
husbands," and attendance and work or academic performance tends

to suffer.27
So, too, the authors of hate speech codes were concerned with the
potential damage done to victims of racial or other harassment. Mari
Matsuda, one of the prime advocates of hate speech codes, warned that
"negative effects of hate messages are real and immediate for the victims." 2s Richard Delgado, a colleague of Matsuda and a coauthor of the

University of Wisconsin's speech code, describes the potential harms
in more detail:
viduals who engage in harassment. By contrast, HWE expands liability past the harasser to his employer.
23. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 7, at 8. See also STEPHEN J. Moiawnrz, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN SocIETy

(1996).

24. In fact, a 1994 survey of 2000 lawyers at twelve large law'firms across the nation
showed that 91% of the women and only 13% of the men had been subject to verbal
harassment within the past year. See Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman"
Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet ofHostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEo. LJ. 399, 403 (1996).
25. Epstein, supra note 24, at 404 (citations omitted).
26. MoRtwrrz, supra note 23, at 253.
27. MoREwrrz, supranote 23, at 254.
28. Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. Ray. 2320, 2336 (1989).
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The psychological responses to such stigmatization consist of
feelings of humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred.... [It]
injures its victims' relationships with others ... [and] may
also result in mental illness and psychosomatic disease....
The psychological injuries severely handicap the victim's pursuit of a career. The person who is timid, withdrawn, bitter,
hypertense, or psychotic will almost certainly fare poorly in
employment settings.... Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, racism and racial labeling have an even greater impact on
children than on adults... [as] minority children [may come
to] exhibit self-hatred because of their color.29
Even the court that ultimately rejected Wisconsin's code acknowledged that "[s]tudies show that victims of discriminatory harassment
have experienced physiological symptoms and emotional distress

ranging from fear, rapid pulse rate, difficulty in breathing, nightmares,

30
post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis and suicide."
If harassment law and speech codes have both similar elements
and purposes, it would seem natural that they cover similar fact patterns. Certainly, both claims cover physical harassment, whether
touching, groping, graffiti, or acts of sabotage. For example, in the case
of Maturo v. National Graphics, Inc., the court found sexual harassment when a co-worker "came up from behind plaintiff, grabbed her
arms, and ... fondled her .... ,,31 In addition, in Woods v. Graphic
Communications, the court based a finding of harassment on such actions as "a karate chop" and the scrawling of graffiti near the plaintiff's
work space.3
Similarly, collegiate officials intended their hate speech codes to
cover physical acts of harassment. A guide that accompanied the University of Michigan's speech code warned that the provision would
extend to "[r]acist graffiti written on the door of an Asian student's
study carrel" or distributing "[a] flyer containing racist threats ... in a
residence hall."3 3 Officials at the University of Wisconsin disciplined
students under their policy for physical harassment. One student impersonated an immigration official and harassed a Turkish-American

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Delgado, supra note 17, at 91-93.
UWM Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 n.7 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
Maturo v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 916, 921 (D. Conn. 1989).
Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cit. 1991).
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 858 (E.D. Mich, 1989).
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student by demanding to see immigration documents.m Another admitted that ethnic prejudice led him to steal the bank card of his
Japanese 35roommate and illegally withdraw funds from his roommate's
account.

The speech codes also mirror HWE in their application to instances of verbal harassment. The codes of the Universities of
Wisconsin and Michigan both state explicitly that they cover
"comments" or "verbal behavior," and both were applied to cases of
verbal harassment. At the University of Michigan, officials intended
the code to cover racist jokes and epithets.3 The University of Wisconsin disciplined students who harassed others with racial insults and
ethnic or gendered epithets.37
Such fact patterns are substantially similar to those covered under
sexual harassment law, the latter of which may include "genderbaiting," "teasing," or "hazing."38 For example, the court in Katz v.
Dole upheld a claim of sexual harassment 9 where the "harassment took
the form of extremely vulgar and offensive sexually related epithets ...
widely recognized as not only improper but as intensely degrading,
deriving their power to wound not only from their meaning
40 but also
,
phonetically.'
express
they
from the 'disgust and violence
The Katz court was among the more decorous, refusing to list the
degrading words at issue. But, sexual harassment involves words. There
are cases in which "cunt" and "pussy" are some of the more pleasant
terms used,41 and others where women "confront their tormenter in
front of their manager with, 'You have called me a fucking bitch,'
[only to be answered,] 'No, I didn't. I called you a fucking cunt.' 4,2 In
fact, the Supreme Court has refused to overturn a case of sexual har-

34.
35.
36.
37.

See UWM Post,774 F. Supp. at 1167.
See UWMPost, 774 F. Supp. at 1168.
See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 858.
See UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1166-68 (cataloging disciplinary actions of harassers
including a student who sent a computer message to an Iranian faculty member declaring "Death to All Arabs!! Die Islamic scumbags!" and others who yelled epithets
including "piece of shit nigger," "fat-ass nigger," and "fucking cunt" at their classmates).
38. See LINDEMANN& KADuE, supra note 7, at 170.
39. Katzv. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,254 (4th Cir. 1983).
40. Katz, 709 F.2d at 254 (quoting C. MILR & K. SWIFr, WORDS O1 WOMEN 109

(1977)).
41. See, e.g., Rabidue v.Osceola Ref Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
42. McNabb v. Cub Foods, 352 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. 1984).
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assment based largely on "sexual innuendos." 43 In Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., the company president "often insulted [the employee]
because of her gender, ... [telling her] on several occasions, in the
presence of other employees, 'You're a woman, what do you know'
and 'We need a man as the rental manager'; at least once, he told her
she was 'a dumb ass woman.,,44
In response, some courts have gone so far as to require that employers "take prompt action to prevent.., bigots from expressing their
opinions in a way that abuses or offends their co-workers," so as to
"inform[] people that the expression of racist or sexist attitudes in
public is unacceptable."4 5 Others have banned such inquiries as "[d]id
you get any over the weekend?" 6 As one commentator has noted, cases
of HWE may restrict more speech than the hate speech codes ever intended. "Many courts have permitted [sexual] harassment actions to
proceed based in part upon offensive speech that was not directed toward the plaintiff."47 Others have "permitted [sexual] harassment
actions based in part upon speech that was not even witnessed by the
plaintiff." 8 In fact, it was not until 1991 that a defendant raised, and a
court ruled on, a First Amendment defense to HWE. In Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, the court balanced the "governmental interest in
cleansing the workplace of impediments to the equality of women"
against the free speech interest in "sexually demeaning remarks and
jokes," as well as "pictures of nude and partially nude women in sexually suggestive poses." 49 Not surprisingly given the terms of this test,
the court found the First Amendment defense lacking. Yet Robinson is
far from an anomaly. As Professor Eugene Volokh has amply chronicled, the courts are quite willing to uphold claims of verbal harassment
in the workplace. 0

43. See Harrisv. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).
44. Harris,510 U.S. at 19.

45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.

LINDEMANN & KADUE,

supra note 7, at 584 (citing Davis v. Montsanto Chem. Co.,

858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3166 (1989)).
Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123, 128 (W.D. Tenn. 1981).
Browne, supranote 8, at 535.
Browne, supra note 8, at 535. This point should be remembered by the reader for
later sections where this Article considers the courts' conclusion that the speech codes
were overbroad. Even these courts acknowledge that the speech codes were applied to
face-to-face harassment.
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RuTGERs LJ. 563

(1995).
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The same is true for sexual harassment policies created for college
campuses. According to a 1994 study of the policies at public universities, 300 of 384 schools had a sexual harassment policy.5 Almost all
of the policies were modeled on the EEOC's regulations, and many
took an expansive view of verbal behavior. The University of Iowa's
policy, for example, defined "verbal conduct" to cover comments,
statements, jokes, questions, anecdotes, and remarks.5 Even a policy
statement from the American Council on Education suggested that
sexual harassment could include "inappropriate put-downs of individual persons."53 Yet with a few isolated examples, the courts have largely
refused to restrict or overturn the application of university sexual harassment codes to cases of verbal harassment." The courts' abstention
even led a prominent employment attorney to recommend that schools
adopt policies against racial harassment, just as they had done with
sexual harassment, or face potential liability from student litigants.55
I.

DisPARITY IN JUDICIAL TREATMENT

While the terms of collegiate speech codes were substantially
similar to those of sexual harassment claims, and while they were directed toward similar harms, the courts have treated them very
differently. Sexual harassment is widely recognized by the courts as a
valid legal claim. Campus hate speech codes, however, have been ruled
unconstitutional.

51. See ARATi R
UNRSriEs

KORWAR, WAR OF WORDS: SPEECH CODES AT PUBLIC COLLEGES AND

35-50 (1994).

52. See SExuAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: A LEGAL COMPENDIUM 179 (Elsa Kircher

Cole ed., 1990). 53. SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS, supra note 52, at 224.

54. See, e.g., Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Community College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th
Cir. 1996); Silva v. University of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994).
55. At a 1988 convention of the National Association of College and University Attorneys, Walter B. Connolly, Jr., a Detroit lawyer who specializes in equal employment
litigation, advised university counsels to adopt "specific policies for handling incidents
of racial harassment, just as many have adopted procedures for dealing with sexual
harassment of students and employees." Cheryl M. Fields, Colleges Advised to Develop
Strong Proceduresto Deal With Incidents of RacialHarassment,CHRON. HIGHER ED.,
July 20, 1988 at All. According to Connolly, decisions from the federal courts
.upheld the idea that employees are entitled to a 'harassment-free work place,'" and
in Connolly's view, future cases were likely to extend this right from sexual to racial
harassment. Id.
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A. Sexual Harassment
It has been over twenty years since the federal courts first considered sexual harassment cases. Over that time the lower courts have
legitimized the claim. The Supreme Court decided in 1986 that sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and extends to the creation of a hostile or intimidating work environment. 6 It is important to remember that the claim of sexual
harassment is exclusively a creation of the common law. At no time has
Congress passed legislation expressly prohibiting sexual harassment.
While the EEOC has issued regulations both defining and prohibiting
sexual harassment, the courts have essentially created this doctrine by
reading a claim of sexual harassment into the larger area of sex discrimination. At any point the courts might have retreated, and in fact,
there were ample legal bases to refuse to create the tort. Judges might
have declined to create new law when there was not direct statutory
support.5 They might have concluded that the terms of the claim, in-

cluding such requisites as "unwelcome," "hostile," or "intimidating,"
were too ambiguous to survive judicial scrutiny. They might have
refused to extend the claim to verbal harassment. Or they might have

dismissed the underlying theory of sexual harassment on the grounds
that it would "chill" relations in the workplace by making coworkers
"walk on egg shells."

To be sure, several courts have adopted these positions and refused to recognize sexual harassment claims." The vast majority of

56. See Menitor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
57. According to the courts, sexual harassment flows from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which
or refuse to hire or to discharge any indideclares it unlawful for "an employer to fail
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi." At no point does this statute
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin...
explicitly mention sexual harassment. Rather, the courts have read sexual harassment
to be sex discrimination "with respect to [an individual's] terms... of employment."
Meritor,477 U.S. at 63.
58. "A statute is unconstitutionally vague when 'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.' A statute must give adequate warning of the conduct
which is to be prohibited and must set out explicit standards for those who apply it."
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973) (citations omitted)).
59. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986); Clark v. World
Airways, Inc., 1980 WL 271 (D.D.C. 1980); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F.

Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacatedand remanded,562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
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federal courts that have heard harassment cases, however, recognize the
claim. Indeed, the courts have gone to great lengths to clarify and detail the requirements of a harassment claim. In defining what cases rise
to the level of a hostile or intimidating environment, the courts have
added the requirement that verbal or physical conduct be "severe" or
"pervasive." 0 The courts have also grappled with the proper standard
for evaluating such conduct-whether acts should be viewed
"objectively" from the courts' perspective or "subjectively" from that of
the victim. The accepted rule, that cases be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person in the same circumstances of the victim, is
again a creation of the courts, as is much of the tort.6 Time and again
the courts have chosen to recognize the claim, even breathing life into
its details, when at any time they might have rejected the very theory.
The courts' deference to sexual harassment law is shown most

clearly in the case of R.A. V v. City of St. Paul62 There the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to consider a municipal hate code: St. Paul,
Minnesota's "Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance." 63 Under that ordi-

nance, individuals were prohibited from displaying a symbol "which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
...... "6 In a somewhat fragmented opinion, the Supreme Court
overturned the law on the basis of its "content discrimination." As the
Court said, the ordinance was "facially unconstitutional because it imposes special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on the
disfavored subjects of 'race, color, creed, religion, or gender.' At the

60. As they iterate, "[t]o affect a 'term, condition or privilege' of employment within the
meaning of Title VII, the harassment 'must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."'" Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (alteration in original). This test "is a question to be determined
with regard to the totality of the circumstances." Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1523. As
another court has said, "[w]hile an isolated incident is not enough, the number of incidents alone is not determinative.... Conversely, incidents that are much less severe
may constitute harassment in the context of a working atmosphere 'polluted' with"
racial tension. Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (9th
Cir. 1991) (citations ommirted).
61. For a judicial explanation, see Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1271
(7th Cir. 1991).
62. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
63. SeeR.AV, 505 U.S. at 379.
64. RA. V, 505 U.S. at 379 (quoting ST. PAuL, MiNN. LEGL., CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
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same time, it permits displays containing abuse invective if they are
not addressed to those topics."'
Under this reasoning, one also might have expected the Court to
overturn sexual harassment law. It too "imposes special prohibitions on
those speakers who express views on the disfavored subject[] of...
gender," and as the lower courts have shown, an individual may not
hurl sexual invectives at his female coworkers and escape a finding of
sexual harassment." Yet the Supreme Court refused to include sexual
harassment claims in its broad prohibition against content discrimination. In fact, the Court went so far as to craft a deliberate exception for
sexual harassment, saying such claims really reflect a situation where "a
particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech
can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at
conduct rather than speech."6 7
This exception did not escape the attention of the concurring justices in R.A. V In criticizing the majority's reasoning, Justices White,
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens noted that "[u]nder the broad
principle the Court uses to decide the present case, hostile work environment claims based on sexual harassment should fail First
Amendment review." 6' Because the Court could not accept that result,

the concurrence suggests, it crafted an exception to cover sexual harassment claims.
The Court has been widely criticized for its decision in R.A. V,

both for refusing to overturn the claim of verbal harassment on First
Amendment grounds,69 and for failing to offer the lower courts clear
guidance to adjudicate sexual harassment claims when the offending
conduct is verbal. 70 This debate continues unabated, as the Court has
still failed to address the constitutionality of verbal harassment claims.
In fact, in the term preceding R.A. V the Justices declined "to mention
the First Amendment objections to Tide VII's harassment law" even
though the case under review, Harrisv. ForkliftSystems, Inc., dealt with

65. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 378.
66. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 378. Technically, it is the employer who would be found liable
for maintaining a hostile work environment, but it is the behavior of supervisors or
coworkers that create the hostile work environment.
67. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 389.
68. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 410 (White, J., concurring).
69. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 8, at 512-13..
70. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 8, at 705.
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misogynist speech. 7' The Court's silence has had a snowball effect on

the lower courts; without contrary precedent from the Supreme Court,
"most courts adjudicating harassment suits either avoid the issue [of

verbal harassment] or assume that the speech allegedly contributing to
a hostile environment is unprotected."72
B. Hate Speech Codes
As PA.V indicates, the courts have not been very receptive to
hate speech codes. To date, four cases involving collegiate speech codes
have been heard by the courts and each hate speech code has been rejected as unconstitutional. The first code to reach the courts was that
of the University of Michigan. In Doe v. University of Michigan,73
Judge Avern Cohn overturned Michigan's code, arguing that the rule
was both overbroad in its application and ambiguous in its terms. 74 As
the court said,
What the University could not do ...was to establish an
anti-discrimination policy which had the effect of prohibiting
certain speech because it disagreed with ideas or messages
sought to be conveyed.... Looking at the plain language of
the Policy, it was simply impossible to discern any limitation
on its scope or any conceptual distinction between protected
and unprotected conduct.... [T]he terms "stigmatize" and
"victimize" are not self defining [and are thus ambiguous].
These words can only be understood with reference to some
exogenous value system. What one individual might find
victimizing or stigmatizing, another individual might not.75

71. See, Estlund, supra note 8, at 692. The Court's reluctance is especially notable wheth
one considers that a number of amic curiae encouraged the justices to address the
First Amendment issues. See Estlund, supra note 8, at 692 n.20.
72. Estlund, supra note 8, at 709.
73. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
74. See id. at 864-67. Under the constitutional doctrine of overbreadth, "statutes regulating First Amendment activities must be narrowly drawn to address only the
specific evil at hand." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973). "A law
regulating speech will be deemed overbroad if it sweeps within its ambit a substantial
amount of protected speech along with that which it may legitimately regulate."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
75. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863, 867, 859.
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A similar ruling came down in UWM Post v. Board of Regents,76
holding that the University of Wisconsin's speech code was also unconstitutional. Although the judge was more forgiving in determining
that most terms of the code were unambiguous, he still ruled that Wisconsin's rule was overbroad. Said the court, the "UW Rule has
overbreadth difficulties ... the terms nevertheless allow the rule to
prohibit protected speech .... Content-based prohibitions such as that
in the UW Rule, however well intended, simply cannot survive the
screening which our Constitution demands." 77
The Michigan and Wisconsin decisions may well have stood as a
model for later courts that considered the speech codes of Central
Michigan University (CMU) and Stanford University. In Dambrot v.

CentralMichigan University, Judge Robert Cleland overturned a campus rule that prohibited any "verbal ... behavior that subjects an
individual to an intimidating, hostile or offensive educational... environment by demeaning or slurring individuals ... because of their
racial or ethnic affiliation." 78 Borrowing from Doe, the court found
that CMU's policy
.. 79 was overbroad, vague, and an impermissible viewpoint restriction.
Similarly, in Corry v. Stanford University, a Santa Clara Circuit
Court threw out Stanford's speech code on the grounds that the. University "prohibited certain expressions based on the underlying
message."8 0 Although Stanford's code was a little different-in that it
prohibited "fighting words" 8l-the court's decision followed on that of
Dambrot.and R.A.V Because the speech rule proscribed only those
fighting words "based on sex, race, color, and the like," the court held

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

UWM Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
UWMPost,774 F. Supp. at 1163, 1181.
Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 481 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
See Dambrot,839 F. Supp. at 482-490.
Corry v. Stanford Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. filed Feb. 27, 1995) at 12.
Stanford University's rule, entitled "Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Ex-

pression and Discriminatory Harassment," reads as follows:
Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification if
it: a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of
individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation, or national and ethnic origin; and b) is addressed directly to
the individual or individuals whom it insults or stigmatizes; and c) makes
use of insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal symbols. <ht4://
lawschool.stanford.edu/-library/decisions/corrycom.html>
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it to be an "impermissible content-based regulation" prohibited by the
First Amendment.
III. TRADITIONAL

EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DISPARITY

Few courts have sought to explain the different treatment between
hate speech codes and sexual harassment claims. Both the Doe and
UWM Post courts have considered this question, as has the Ninth Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals, 3 but judicial explanations seem to stop there. In
some sense, that is what makes this inquiry so interesting. Because the
courts have not been clear in their justifications, we need to work to
uncover the explanation.
As a first step, we need to consider the possibility that there are
valid legal bases for the courts' divergence. Again, while the courts
have not been especially clear in identifying their reasoning, there are
four legal theories the courts might have used to distinguish hate
speech codes from HWE claims. Although each may appear reasonable
on its surface, I ultimately conclude that none fully explains the courts'
behavior.
A. Employment vs. EducationalSettings
In UWM Post, the University of Wisconsin argued that its speech
code was constitutional because its "prohibition of discriminatory
speech which creates a hostile environment" paralleled the existing
standard under Title VII. However, Judge Robert Warren rejected the
University's position, concluding that "Title VII addresses employment, not educational, settings." 84 While sexual harassment law was

constitutional, hate speech codes covered a different environment that
was neither included in nor protected by Title VII.
As an initial matter, the judge was correct in describing Title VII's
reach. There can be little doubt that the legislation addresses employment settings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 is entitled "Unlawful Employment
Practices," and the Supreme Court made clear in Meritor Savings Bank

82. Cony, Case No. 740309, at 12.
83. See Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Community College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir.
1996). See infra Part 111.2 for a more detailed discussion of this case.

84. UWM Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1177 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
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v. Vinson that sexual harassment covers "acts of employees for which
employers under Title VII are to be held responsible." 5 Judge Warren
was also right that Tide VII fails to mention academic life, whether
classrooms, residence halls, or extracurricular activities. Statutorily,
there is little to suggest that collegiate speech codes would be included
in Title VII.
In some sense, however, Judge Warren missed the point. The
question is not whether speech codes are authorized by an employment
statute. Rather, the issue is whether collegiate speech codes should be
found constitutional given that the provision upon which they are
based is constitutional. Put another way, if employers may restrict the
speech of their employees so as to prevent a hostile work environment,
why can't universities regulate the conduct of their members so as to
avert a hostile academic environment?
The conventional explanation tells us that speech restrictions are
acceptable in the workplace because, unlike college campuses, "the
First Amendment has no application" there.16 According to this approach, the First Amendment protects "public discourse"-those
ccommunicative processes necessary for the formation of public opinion."8 7 By their very nature, universities are concerned with public
discourse, but as the same commentators maintain, "speech in the
workplace does not generally constitute public discourse."88 "Within
the workplace ... an image of dialogue among89 autonomous selfgoverning citizens would be patently out of place."
Yet this view fails to appreciate the expanding role of the workplace in public discourse. "Communication contributing to public
opinion is [hardly] limited to the press, handbillers on public streets,
and fiery orators in the parks.... [F]or most citizens-who are not
political activists-the great bulk of their discussion of political and
social issues probably occurs in the home and the workplace." 9 Indeed,
the special import of speech in the workplace is crucially affected by the role of the workplace as an intermediate

85. Meritor Sav. Bankv. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
86. Browne, supranote 8, at 513.
87. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy & the FirstAmendment, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 288 (1991).
88. Browne, supra note 8, at 515 (discussing UWMPost).
89. Post, supranote 87, at 289.
90. Browne, supranote 8, at 515.
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institution in the society. The workplace mediates between
individuals and the society as a whole, and it affords a space
in which individuals cultivate some of the values, habits, and
traits that carry over to their roles as citizens. In the workplace individuals interact with others-initially strangers,
often from diverse cultural, ethnic, political and religious
backgrounds-in a constructive way toward common aims."
If one did not know this passage's source, she might well consider
it to be from a college catalogue. And with good reason. Just as the
workplace serves as an intermediate institution, so too the college
campus brings together young people of varied backgrounds to learn
from and with each other. Open dialogue is important in each setting.
Of course, the two differ in important respects. Unlike the college
student, an employee is paid to work, not converse. Moreover, the
college campus is composed of several settings-classroom, dormitories, open fora-each of which demands different approaches by the
First Amendment. Even if we accept the notion that the classroom and
workplace share much in common, the Supreme Court has already
ruled that a college campus, "at least for its students, possesses many of
92
the characteristics of a public forum."
These differences, however, need not derail the analysis. Much of
this Article considers the courts' treatment of harassment on the shop
floor and in the classroom, the two sites that are most comparable. In
this respect, both HWE and speech codes seek to prevent the same
kind of harassment-speech so serious or pervasive that it interferes
with the workplace or classroom. Contrary to those who see speech
codes as governing a wider variety of speech, the codes' terms cover
only those comments that create a hostile educational environment.
Infrequent remarks and obscure criticisms should not trigger the
codes, just as similar comments would not invoke Title VII.
Even if we consider other venues on campus, the analysis need
not fail. If we move out of the classroom and into the dormitories, civility restraints are even more important. A student's dorm room is her
home on campus, and the added privacy she deserves there includes
protection against uninvited and offensive harassment. 3 Perhaps the

91. Esdund, supra note 8, at 727.
92. Vidmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 (1981).
93. As Coleman and Alger add,
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only place on campus where speech codes would be inappropriate is
the college public square, where students set up tables and soap boxes
and debate the finer (and not so fine) points of the day. This I would
concede is close to a public forum, a site at which no one need visit or
remain. I certainly appreciate the perspective of those who argue a
college campus cannot be a true public forum-that because the entire
college serves an intermediate function, civility restraints are inappropriate even in the campus square. We need not concern ourselves,
however, with this question. None of the college speech codes was applied to speech in the campus square. More importantly, as will be
discussed in a later section, most of the courts that overturned the hate
speech codes confined their analysis to classroom speech.
But if the workplace shares a quasi-public aspect with college
campuses, how do we justify speech restrictions in either setting? In
fact, aren't we trying to have it both ways? Under traditional First
Amendment jurisprudence, both settings are either private fora, where
speech may be more easily regulated, or the two are public sites where
speech is presumed to be free and open. How does one justify HWE in

this situation, let alone hate speech codes?
The answer, I think, comes from Cynthia Esdund, who herself
borrows from Robert Post. To the extent that both the workplace and
the college campus produce public discourse, civility restraints are appropriate in each to prevent the type of poisoned attacks that destroy
rational deliberation and the "possibility of constructive engagement."" This is not the same thing as advocating content controls,
although the two may look similar at times. Civility restraints, instead,
are a set of ground rules that say open dialogue rests on an assumption
of decorum, that free speech is impossible in an atmosphere of personal attack. As Esdund herself explains:

college dormitories are essentially the temporary private residences of individuals within the microcosm of a society that is a higher education
institution. Thus, the educational benefits in this context must by necessity
include the benefits typically associated with living in one's own home, including privacy, personal security and safety. Conduct within this realm of
interaction must be regulated to the extent necessary to protect these interests.
Arthur L. Coleman & Jonathan R Alger, Beyond Speech Codes: HarmonizingRights of
Free Speech andFreedomfrom Discriminationon University Campuses, 23 J.C. & U.L.
91, 121 (1996).

94. Esdund, supranote 8, at 736.
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If we understand public discourse as speech that is relevant to
the collective process of self-definition and decisionmaking,
then civility constraints and the preconditions of rational deliberation seem to belong somewhere within the realm of
public discourse .... On this view, institutions such as
schools and workplaces may be important sites for public discourse, though surely not unbounded critical interaction. 9'
Civility restraints also imply a certain level of equality in both the
workplace and classroom. If both sites serve as mediating institutions,
it is crucial that no group of workers or students (faculty or stafo receive special preferences or disparate treatment without a valid basis.
Against this backdrop, some commentators have argued that the
Cgovernment's interest in workplace equality stands alone as a justification for punishing some verbal harassment." 96 As they say, "speech

that the speaker knows is offensive," that is directed at an employee
because of her sex, and that creates a hostile work environment may be
restricted because it devalues the position of women in the workplace.97
Again, however, it is entirely unclear why this rationale should not also
extend to the classroom. As another commentator admits, "if the
workplace context of offensive speech matters only because of the importance of equality in employment, then similar speech restrictions
should be accepted in any sphere in which we could discern a strong
commitment to equality, such as education ....98
This distinction between campus and the workplace becomes even
more clouded when one considers that universities have borrowed directly from Tide VII by applying sexual harassment rules to the
academic setting. As mentioned earlier in this Article, 300 of 384 public universities had adopted sexual harassment rules for their campuses
as of 1994. 99 Many policies, like that of the University of Iowa, cover
any "verbal... conduct of a sexual nature" that creates "an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for work or learning."'00 But
Iowa's policy seems to fly in the face of the courts' distinction by

95. Esdund, supra note 8, at 714 (citing Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech
and Workplace Harassment,39 UCLA L. Rev. 1791, 1843-47 (1992)).
96. See Volokh, supranote 95, at 1846.
97. See, e.g., Volokh, supranote 95, at 1834-47.
98. Esdund, supra note 8, at 715.
99. See KORWAR, supranote 51, at 34-50.

100. Smu. HAR SMmEN ON CAmpus, supra note 52, at 179 (emphasis added).
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lumping workplace and classroom speech together. If, as the courts
maintain, there are different rules for the peech acceptable in the
workplace and the classroom, then one would expect harassment policies like Iowa's to fail. However, with two notable exceptions,'"' the
courts have refused to entertain challenges to university sexual harassment policies. The cases include McClellan v. Board of Regents, in
which the Supreme Court of Tennessee ruled "Itihere is no meaningful difference ... between sexual harassment in the workplace and
sexual harassment in an academic setting;"' 0 2 Parks v. Wilson, °3 where a
district court explained that the "policies underlying [Tide VII] support with equal force imposition of the same standard in the school
setting;" 1c4 as well as federal cases in Illinois'0 ' and Ohio10 6 which presumed that students could bring sexual harassment charges under
university policies premised on Tide VII.
It is not just universities, however, that are leveling the wall between the workplace and the classroom. The courts are doing it
themselves by using Tide IX to apply sexual harassment standards to
academia. Title IX, of course, is federal legislation "designed to protect
individuals from sex discrimination by denying federal financial aid to
those educational institutions that bear responsibility for sexually discriminatory practices."'0 7 Tide IX provides that: No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis108
tance....
At no point does Title IX speak of sexual harassment, nor does it
reference terms from Tide VII or any other employment-related legislation or regulation. Yet, the "courts have regularly applied Tide VII
principles" when "reviewing sexual discrimination claims by teachers
and other employees of educational institutions under Tide IX.""'9

101. See Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Community College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir.
1996); Silva v. University of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994).
102. McClellan v. Board of Regents, 921 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tenn. 1996).
103. Parks v. Wilson, 872 F.Supp. 1467 (D.S.C. 1995).

104. Parks v. Wilson, 872 F.Supp. at 1470.
105. See Rubin v.Ikenberry, 933 F. Supp. 1425 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
106. See Mann v. University of Cincinnati, 864 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
107. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1412 (11th Cir.
1997)(Barkett, J., dissenting), cert.granted, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998).
108. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
109. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1415.

MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER &rLAW

. [Vol. 6:153

Indeed, "the United States Supreme Court has already endorsed the
adoption of substantial aspects of Title VII law into Tide IX for
teacher-to-student hostile environment sexual harassment."'' n Granted,
many of these cases involve primary or secondary schools where the
greater need for discipline may outweigh other interests in public discourse,"' but Tide IX has also been used to apply the HWE standard
to sexual harassment at the university level.1 2 Nor do these cases involve only university employment, where Tide VII principles would be
appropriate; many of Tide IX's sexual harassment claims begin in the
classroom. They include such cases as Rubin v. Ikenbeny,' where a
professor regularly engaged in outrageous "sexual commentary, inquiries and jokes during class."114 If, as the UWM Post court maintains,
Tide VII is limited to employment matters and Tide IX restricted to
academia, then cases like Rubin should have been rejected. If anything,
however, the courts have erred in the other direction. The Supreme
Court established in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools that a
student has an action for sexual harassment under Tide IX similar to
that which an employee has under Tide VII: 5
Unquestionably, Tide IX placed on the Gwinnett County
Public Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of
sex, and "when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." We believe the same
rule should 6apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses
a student.1

110. Edward S. Cheng, Recent Development: Boys Being Boys and Girls Being GirlsStudent-to-Student Sexual Harassmentfrom the Courtroom to the Classroom, 7 UCLA
WOMEN's L.J. 263, 315 (1997).

111. See, e.g., Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
112. See, e.g., Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985),
affid, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); see also, Bishop v. University of Ala., 926 F.2d
1066 (11th Cir. 1991).

113. Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F. Supp. 1425 (C.D. Il. 1996).
114. Id. at 1429.
115. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
116. Id. at 75 (alteration in original)(citation omitted). A California court further stated
that "distinctions between the school environment and the workplace serve only to
emphasize the need for zealous protection against sex discrimination in the schools."
Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292-93 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
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Title IX is only the first of a wave of new statutes that are applying legal norms from the workplace to the classroom. The Department
of Education, among others, has issued a "Notice of Investigative
Guidance" detailing the procedures and analysis its staff "will follow
when investigating issues of racial incidents and harassment against
students at educational institutions." 117 In many ways, the Department's Guidance mirrors the speech codes shot down by the courts,
but as of today the Guidance still stands, applying norms from sexual
harassment law to the classroom. As the Guidance states:
A violation ... may also be found if [an educational institution] has created or is responsible for a racially hostile
environment-i.e., harassing conduct (e.g., physical, verbal,
graphic or written) that is sufficiently severe, pervasive or
persistent so as to interfere with or limit the ability of an individual to participate in or benefit from the services,
activities or privileges provided by [the institution].!"
Again, if the UWM Post court is correct, the Guidance should fall,

as should statutes passed by the California, Illinois, and Wisconsin
legislatures. In each state, lawmakers have "enacted legislation to combat sexual harassment in education and/or post-secondary institutions
as well [as] on the job.". 19 It simply cannot be the case, then, that Title
VII principles fail to reach the educational setting. Although Judge
Warren may opine as much, his brethren, as well as the Department of
Education and at least three state legislatures, disagree.
Furthermore, the EEOC has reinforced the connection between
workplace and classroom when it recently extended Tide VII's reach.
Originally, the EEOC's regulations prohibited only sexual harassment.
However, in the early 1990s, the EEOC amended its regulations to
announce what the courts had recognized earlier-that the "principles
[of sexual harassment law] continue to apply to race, color, religion or
national origin." 20 The EEOC did more, however. In adopting a generic harassment provision, the Commission borrowed almost directly
from the collegiate hate speech codes. Under its new regulation,

117. Notice of Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11448 at 11448 (1994).
118. Notice of Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. at 11449 (emphasis added).
119. MoRwrrz, supra note 23, at 267 (citing JOHN LEWIS ET AL., SEXUAL HARASSMENT
iN EDUCATION

(1992)).

120. 29 C.F.R § 1604.11(a) n. 1 (1998).
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employers may now be held liable for creating a work environment
where "ethnic slurs and other verbal or physical conduct relating to an
individual's national origin" are tolerated. 121 Certainly, the EEOC may
have come to this rule on its own, but the inclusion of ethnic slurs is
just too similar to Wisconsin's and Stanford's speech codes-both of
which covered ethnic slurs or epithets. When one also considers that
the EEOC developed this new rule shortly after Michigan and Wisconsin enacted their speech codes, it seems likely that the EEOC was
taking a lesson from academia. Like those entities that extended Title
VII to the educational environment, the EEOC also recognized a connection between the classroom and the workplace.
B. SpecialStatus of Colleges and Universities
Even if Tide VII principles extend to academic life, courts may be
reluctant to enforce speech restrictions, whether premised on racial or
other forms of harassment, for fear of chilling intellectual inquiry on
campus. Perhaps the best example of a court's concern is Cohen v. San
Bernardino Valley College,"z where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

refused to enforce a college's sexual harassment policy against an English professor.Il 3 In that case, the College of San Bernardino had
adopted a sexual harassment policy modeled almost identically on Title
VII standards.'24 Shortly after its adoption, a female student charged
her professor with violating the new policy for his "statements and
conduct" in class. 125 The professor taught a required remedial English
course, and according to the district court, used a "controversial
teaching style," which included a "repeated focus on topics of a sexual
nature" and regular "use of profanity and vulgarities."0 6 In the spring
semester of 1992:

121. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(b) (1998)
122. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996). Under the
policy, a faculty member could be disciplined for "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal, written or physical conduct of a sexual
nature" when "such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's academic performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive learning environment." Cohen, 92 F.3d at 971.
123. 14d at 970.
124. See Cohen, 92 F.3d at 970-71.
125. Cohen, 92 F.3d at 970.
126. Cohen, 92 F.3d at 970.
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[He] began a class discussion on... the issue of pornography
and played the "devil's advocate" by asserting controversial
viewpoints. During classroom discussion on this subject, [the
professor] stated in class that he wrote for Hustler and Playboy, and he read some articles out loud in class. [He]
concluded the class discussion by requiring his students to
write essays defining pornography... According to [the
student, the professor] then told her that if she met him in a
bar he would help her get a better grade. She also claimed
that [he] would look down her shirt, as well as the shirts of
other female students, and that he told her she was overreacting because she was a woman.
Were a similar fact pattern to occur in the workplace, a court
would likely find a violation of sexual harassment. Indeed, Cohen is not
that different from Morgan v. Hertz,12 where a supervisor questioned
employees about their sexual practices,' 29 or EEOC v. Horizons Hotel
Cor.p., where a coworker unleashed a "stream of comments about [the

plaintiff's] body" and propositioned her for sex. 3' In Cohen, however,
the Ninth Circuit ruled that the professor's behavior:
did not fall within the core region of sexual harassment as
defined by the Policy. Instead, officials of the College, on an
entirely ad hoc basis, applied the Policy's nebulous outer
reaches to punish teaching methods that [the professor] had
used for many years.... [The professor] was simply without
any notice that the Policy would be applied in such a way as
to punish his longstanding teaching style ....
It is difficult to see how the court could reach this decision unless
it concluded that special "protection [should] be given a public college
professor's classroom speech." 32 Among other things, its conclusion
that the faculty member had to be warned of the policy's reach would
be preposterous if applied in the workplace. In such case, a group of
127. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 883 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal.

1995), rev'd,92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996).
128. Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1981).
129. See id. at 128.

130. EEOC v. Horizons Hotel Corp., 831 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D.P. R. 1993).
131. Cohen, 92 F.3d at 972.
132. Cohen, 92 F.3d at 971.
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men who had previously hassled their female coworkers could not be
held responsible under a sexual harassment rule unless they were first
personally warned. This is simply not the case, as employees are held
responsible for informing themselves of new personnel policies and
conforming their behavior to any new standards. 33
Cohen is one of the few cases in which a court has refused to apply
a sexual harassment policy to the classroom setting, ' but its deference
to the academic process may be reflected in the Doe, UWM Post, Dambrot, and Cony courts' decisions to overturn university speech codes.
One sees strands of this perspective in Judge Warren's statement that
the UW Rule "limits the diversity of ideas among students and thereby
prevents the 'robust exchange of ideas' which intellectually diverse
campuses provide." 131 Universities occupy a hallowed position in
American cultural life. We enshrine scholarly life, as politicians, journalists, and other opinion leaders prize the intellectual inquiry carried
on there. It is not inconceivable that the courts too would join this
chorus by applying a heightened First Amendment standard to campus
speech rules.

However, this approach overstates the importance of campus
speech while ignoring the fact that one of the most basic elements of
university life routinely violates free speech norms. As Kingsley
Browne has argued, "some who would protect the speech of students
and faculty [above that of ordinary citizens] possess an elitist perspective that simply values the former group of speakers more than the
latter."'" Browne may exaggerate a bit, but there are those who would
enshrine classroom speech under the cloak of academic freedom and
sequester it from any restrictions whatsoever. Estlund suggests as much
when she says, "[t]he academy is so central [to the system of freedom
of expression] that it claims
its own branch of First Amendment doc137
trine: academic freedom."

However, as the Eleventh Circuit reminds us, academic freedom
is not an independent First Amendment right.'3 To the contrary, col-

133. See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993).
134. See also Silva v. University of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293, 315 (D.N.H. 1994)(finding
university's sexual harassment policy limited academic freedom by using a subjective
standard).
135. UWMPostv. BoardofRegents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1176 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
136. Browne, supra note 8, at 482.
137. Estlund, supra note 8, at 774-75.
138. See Bishop v. University ofAla., 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991).
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leges may regulate expression of students where it materially disrupts
classwork or other university activities or unduly interferes with the
rights of others.'39 In fact, as Cass Sunstein notes, "colleges and universities are often in the business of controlling speech, and their controls
are hardly ever thought to raise free speech problems."14 ° He adds:
There are major limits on what students can say in the classroom. For example, they cannot discuss the presidential
election if the subject is math. The same is true for faculty
members....
... The problem goes deeper. A paper or examination that
goes far afield from the basic approach of the course can be

penalized without offense to the First Amendment."'
Sunstein's approach is supported by two recent cases on classroom
speech. In both Bishop and Rubin, the courts made clear that academic
speech is not immune from sanction.'4 Both courts willingly deferred
to a university's attempt to restrict coercive and harassing speech during classroom discussion. The Eleventh Circuit was perhaps the most
adamant, ruling that "educators do not offend the First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student (or
professor) speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their ',143
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
There are those observers who would decry the Bishop and Rubin
decisions, seeing them as clear cases of viewpoint discrimination.1 " If
they are viewpoint discrimination, however, they are no different from
HWE which also punishes individuals for specific speech-that which
discriminates against women. The question is why so many observers,
and several courts, instinctively flinch when such restrictions are applied to the college campus. Undoubtedly, some are worried about
censorship or creeping restrictions on provocative thought. To be sure,
there is reason to fear censorship. Apart from the McCarthy era, there
139.
140.
141.
142.

See Coleman &Alger, supranote 93, at 121.
Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. Cm. L. Ray. 795, 830 (1993).
Sunstein, supranote 140, at 830.
Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1077; Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F. Supp. 1425, 1433 (C.D.Ill.

996).
143. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074.

144. See Browne, supranote 8; Volokh, supra note 50.
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have been cases in which university officials censored or expelled students because they deviated from "proper" values or beliefs.145 And, of
course, the fear of chilling speech is real, especially in an environment
that prizes open dialogue.
It is entirely possible, however, to use Tide VII norms to forbid
harassment in the classroom without touching other speech that is endemic to the educational mission. That higher education tolerates and
encourages freedom of thought does not mean that we should hold off
from punishing harassment in the classroom. In fact, harassment cases
arise only infrequently and are hardly the epidemic that some claim.
The terms of the offense insure this. By requiring that conduct be so
severe or pervasive that it affects the educational environment, harassment policies screen out many comments and behavior that are merely
annoying, distasteful, or occur only once or twice.
Still, the academic community may object, arguing that their focus on literature, politics, and the like commands complete freedom
from judicial interference. But 'this argument obscures two points.
First, it is the schools themselves that seek to punish harassing speech;
if anything the courts have traditionally deferred to college administrators to set their own rules. 46 More importantly, their objection
obscures a larger reason behind many academicians'-and courts'opposition to speech codes: they don't want the responsibility of
evaluating which speech is permissible and which comments are harassing. I can certainly appreciate this concern, but it fails to relieve
them of the responsibility of removing harassment from the academic
environment. The task is hardly different from other settings, where
supervisors have to distinguish between harmless expressions of opinion and those that actively discriminate. 147Professors and
administrators may not think this is their duty, but they have been
doing similar things for years. Just as a teacher may punish a student
for speaking out of turn or straying wildly off topic, so may he rein in
'a student who seeks to harass another in class. A similar point holds
true for the courts. Just as they have allowed employers to discipline
employees who harass coworkers, they owe colleges the deference to

145. In the 1928 case, Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 A.D. 487, 488 (N.Y. App. Div.
1928), the Supreme Court of New York permitted university administrators to expel
a student because "they did not think of her [as] 'a typical Syracuse girl.'"

146. See Coleman & Alger, supranote 93; Carrie N. Baker, Proposed Title IX Guidelineson
Sex-BasedHarassmentofStudents, 43 EmoRY L.J. 271 (1994).
147. See KNT

GREENAWALT, SP.ECH, CRIME AND THE UsEs OF LANGUAGE (1989).
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punish those students who interfere with the educational rights of others.
C. Universities Overstepping Their Own Policies.
In at least two of the collegiate speech cases, the courts could have
simply ruled that the universities' application of their speech rules was
unconstitutional. This is not the same as saying that the codes themselves were unconstitutional, for as I have argued earlier they so closely
mirror Tide VII's sexual harassment standards that the rules alone
should be constitutional. However, both the Universities of Michigan
and Wisconsin applied their rules so expansively that a court would
have been justified in ruling them unconstitutional under Title VII.
As the court rightly noted in Doe, the University of Michigan issued an Interpretive Guide that was so "integrally related" to its speech
code that it became "an authoritative interpretation of the [code] and
provided examples of sanctionable conduct." '48 According to the
Guide, students might have been found liable under the hate speech
code for any of the following misdeeds:
*

Inviting "everyone on [your] floor [to a party] except
because [you] think she might be a lesone person
49
bian."
* Excluding "someone from a study group because that
person is of a different race, sex, or ethnic origin than
,,150
you are.
* Laughing "at a joke about someone in your class who
stutters." 151
At the University of Wisconsin, administrators did not issue an
interpretive guide, but they also took an expansive interpretation of
their speech code. As the court noted in UWM Post, the Wisconsin
rule was applied to the following altercations:

148.
149.
150.
151.

Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 857-58 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 858.
Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 858.
Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 858.
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At the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh a female student referred "to a black female
student as a 'fat-ass
52
argument."
an
during
nigger'
At the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, a student angrily told an Asian-American student that, "It's people
like you-that's the reason this
country is screwed up"
1 53
and "you don't belong here."

*

At the University of Wisconsin-River Falls, a male student yelled at a female student in public, saying, "you've
got nice tits.""4
Undoubtedly, each of these instances is contemptible, and the
students involved should have been rebuked for their conduct. But not
a single one of these instances would qualify as harassment under Title
VII. As the courts make clear, behavior must be "severe" and/or
"pervasive" to reach the threshold of harassment.'55 "Mere utterance
of
an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
employee does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to
violate Tide VII."156 So too in the collegiate context, it seems unlikely
that a single epithet would so alter the conditions of academic life that
it creates an hostile or abusive educational environment.
If the Doe or UWM Post courts had merely rested their decisions
on this basis, I would have folded up my soapbox and gone home.
Both courts, however, used this justification as only an opening rebuke
to campus speech codes. Indeed, it's as if by "protesting too much" the
courts suggest other explanations for their decisions. Doe was the first
case to consider collegiate speech codes, and it is a thoroughly written
opinion. Judge Cohn examined the wording, application, and
"legislative history" of Michigan's rule before finding that administrators had interpreted the code too broadly. 57 At this point he could
have ended the case with a judgment against the university. Nevertheless, he pressed on to consider whether the rule was also
unconstitutionally vague.' This is hardly unusual, for courts often
look to multiple bases for their decisions, but his treatment of the
152. UWM Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1168 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
153. UWMPost, 774 F. Supp at 1167.
154. UWMPost, 774 F. Supp at 1168.
155. See LNDEmANN &KAD E, supra note 7, at 594.
156. Kishaba v. Hilton Hotels, Corp., 737 F. Supp. 549, 555 (D.C. Haw. 1990).
157.. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864.
158. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 866.
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"vagueness question" is peculiar. The Judge found "the plain language
of the Policy" to be impermissibly vague since "it was simply impossible to discern any limitation" on the terms "stigmatize" or
"victimize."159 Both of these words, said the court, "are general and
elude precise definition."' 6
Yet a similar argument could be made for the terms "severe" or
"pervasive" under Tide VII. Like stigmatize or victimize, "these words
can only be understood with reference to some exogenous value system. What one individual might find [severe] or [pervasive] another
individual might not."' 6' In fact, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that a hostile environment "is not, and by its nature cannot be, a
mathematically precise test."' 62 Even Justice Scalia of all people admits
that the terms "abusive" or "hostile" do "not seem to me to be a very
63
clear standard.... Be that as it may, I know of no other alternative."
The Supreme Court's flexibility has filtered its way down to the
lower courts, where many have been quite willing to read in a definition to the severe and pervasive tests; some have gone so far as to create
a separate reasonableness test to measure pervasiveness. A good example is Rubin, where a federal court upheld the University of Illinois'
sexual harassment policy even though its terms were at least as vague as
the speech code in Doe.IM
Nor is Tide VII the only area of the law in which the Supreme
Court tolerates ambiguity. The Court has upheld bans on "loud and
raucous" noises despite their subjective nature.' 6' And, of course, the
standards for obscenity law are vague, it being difficult to define precisely• whether
a work is "patently offensive" or appeals to the "prurient
,,I66
interest.
In each of these areas the courts are-willing to overlook
ambiguous terms or even fill in the details of vague standards. Given

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867.
Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867.
Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 869.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
Harris,510 U.S. at 23-24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Rubin-v. Ikenberry, 933 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (C.D.Ill. 1996) The University of
Illinois Handbook of Policies and Regulations defines sexual harassment as "[a]ny
unwanted sexual gesture, physical contact, or statement that a reasonable person
would find offensive, humiliating, or any interference with his or her required tasks
or career opportunities at the University."
165. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
166. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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such deference, it is difficult to understand why the Doe court was so
reluctant to define stigmatize or victimize.
In this vein, there was also ample opportunity for the Doe and
UWAk[ Post courts to sidestep the constitutional issues if they had
wanted to uphold the university speech codes. Rather than throwing
out the entire code, either court might have borrowed from sexual harassment law by limiting the speech rules to behavior that was severe or
pervasive. Granted, both universities would have had to backtrack in
the application of their codes (seeing that most of the incidents had
failed to reach severe or pervasive behavior), but the codes themselves
could have stood. This is hardly novel. Given that both codes were
modeled on Title VII, it would have been entirely reasonable to use
the same test. What's more, neither court would have had to abandon
free speech concerns to uphold the collegiate codes. As two commentators have noted, "[b]y usually requiring outrageously demeaning or
insulting remarks to have been directed at the complainant before a
hostile environment claim succeeds, courts have in effect incorporated
First Amendment concerns into the definition of sexual harassment. " 167
All that was needed in this instance was a little creativity and an interest in keeping the speech codes viable. Neither was forthcoming.
D. Conduct vs. Speech
Finally, it is possible that the courts distinguished between sexual
harassment laws and hate speech codes by figuring that the former involved "action" but that the latter concerned "speech." It is well settled
in U.S. constitutional law that the First Amendment attaches to
"expression," a term that is generally considered to mean speech. Certainly, some actions can be expressive, including the burning of the
flag 68 or a draft card,' or the donning of offensive apparel. 170 For the
most part, however, the courts tend to distinguish between speech,

167. LINDEMA-N

& KADUE,

supra note 7, at 594.

168. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
169. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1969).
170. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that First Amendment bars
punishment of antiwar protestor for wearing jacket that said "Fuck the Draft" because of the expressive content of the message).
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which are neither.
which is expressive and thus protected, and actions
171
There are few bases to restrict protected speech.
Under Title VII, courts have been known to "try to finesse difficult First Amendment analysis by characterizing disagreeable
expression as 'conduct,"' or actions, and not speech.' 72 In the case of
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,73 for example, a federal court ruled
that pornographic pictures "were not in fact expression but rather
'discriminatory conduct' ... even though the fact remains that displaying pornographic pictures is expression. " '74 Even the Supreme
Court has taken up this line in trying to explain the constitutionality
of sexual harassment law. As the Court said in R.A. V, ' "sexually derogatory 'fighting words"' may be regulated because they are "swept
up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather
than speech."1 76
Conversely, it is clear that the courts in Doe, UWM Post, Dambrot, CMU, and Corry all considered the collegiate hate codes to apply
predominately to speech. The Doe court began and ended its opinion
1

with philosophical essays on the importance of protected speech.'

7 In

UWM Post, the court took to calling the UW Rule a content-based

restriction of speech. 78 Even the Dambrot and Corry courts called the
universities' rules speech codes. 179 Admittedly, the fact patterns in Doe
and CMU covered individuals' speech, but the policies themselves governed both speech and action. Michigan's policy covered "[a]ny
behavior, verbal or physical." 80 CMU's rule included "physical, verbal,
or nonverbal behavior.". 8' At Wisconsin, the code was not only titled

171. As one commentator rightly points out, there is "no expression that is protected or
unprotected under all circumstances. A political speech may be prohibited by regulations prohibiting noise in an intensive-care unit, and obscenity may not be prohibited
by a law that distinguishes among obscene expressions based upon their political
content." Browne, supra note 7, at 483. The point is that, absent a compelling basis,
speech may rarely be restricted while actions are open to regulation.
172. LINDEMANN & KAnuE, supranote 7, at 598.
173. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
174. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 8, at 598.
175. RA.V v. CityofSt. PauI 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
176. Id. at 389.
177. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 853, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
178. See UWM Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1173-74 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
179. See Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 481 (E.D. Mich. 1993);
Corry v. Stanford Univ., No. 740309 at 12 (Cal. Super. filed Feb. 27, 1995).
180. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856.
181. Dambrot,839 F. Supp. at 481.
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"Discriminatory 'Harassment: Prohibited Conduct Under Chapter
UWS 17 Revisions," but it was drafted to cover "comments, epithets
or other expressive behavior or physical conduct.",1 2 Only at Stanford

did the plain language of the rule prohibit "speech or other expression
[that] constitutes harassment by personal vilification."'83
The difficulty of this division between Title VII and collegiate
hate codes is that it ignores a constitutional dilemma they share. It has
not been the case that sexual harassment covers action to the exclusion
of expression. "[C]ourts have consistently interpreted [Title VII to include] 'verbal expression.' Relying on the EEOC's definition of hostileenvironment harassment, courts, both state and federal, have found
employers liable for .. .'obscene propositions,' sexual vulgarity, ...
racial jokes, slurs, and other statements deemed derogatory to minorities .... "'" Indeed, expression "is often a substantial, if not the
primary, basis" that courts use to impose liability." 5 Courts may be
"offended by the implicit or explicit message of the expression-for
example, that women should be sexual playthings for men, that
women (or blacks) do not belong in the "workplace, or that they should
hold an inferior position in our society. ,11

A quick perusal of sexual harassment cases shows this explanation
to be true. As described earlier, the Supreme Court in Harrispermitted
liability when the company president referred to the plaintiff as "a
dumb ass woman" and "made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos." 18 7 In Katz v. Dole, 8' the court found liability under Title VII
for "extremely vulgar and offensive sexually related epithets," including
words "widely recognized as not only improper but as intensely degrading, derfiring their power to wound not only from their meaning
but also from the 'disgust and violence they express phonetically."" 9
The list goes on. In EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel 90 the Ninth Circuit
premised liability on comments comparing the victim to a "dog" and
"whore" and suggesting that women "get pregnant because they like to

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

UWMPost,774 F. Supp. at 1165-66.
Cony, No. 740309 at 3.
Browne, supra note 8, at 482-83.
Browne, supra note 8, at 483.
Browne, supra note 8, at 483.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 254.
EEOCv. HaciendaHotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989).
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suck men's dicks."' 9' Similarly, in EEOC v. Horizons Hotel Corp.,' 92 a
district court based its finding of sexual harassment on a coworker's
"steady stream of comments about [the plaintiffs] body." 193 And in
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., a federal court formally recognized that
pornographic, pictures and94 "sexually-focused" expression "constitute
acts of sexual harassment.",
In each of these cases, expression was either the primary or a substantial factor in finding harassment. As such, they are hardly that
different from some of the scenarios to which the collegiate hate codes
were, or could have been, applied. A supervisor who "yell[s] epithets
loudly at a woman for approximately ten minutes, calling her a
'fiicking bitch' and 'fucking cunt,"' would undoubtedly reach the level
of sexual harassment under Tide VII, just as the student was found to
have violated the University of Wisconsin's hate code in UIWM Post.9,
If, then, the courts are prepared to overrule collegiate hate codes because they reach expression, they need to be ready to do the same for
sexual harassment under Tide VII. Although the Supreme Court has
yet to decide whether Tide VII imposes "liability solely on the basis of
96
it is clear that the lower federal and state courts are
. . expression,"

191. Id. at 1508.
192. EEOCv. Horizons Hotel Corp., 831 F. Supp. 10 (D.P.R. 1993).
193. Id. at 12. According to the court, the coworker's
comments ranged from telling plaintiff that she had a beautiful body to
telling her that he knew that she was in very good condition. He also told
her sexual puns with double meaning (i.e. 'if the breast looks like this how
is the rest?'). He called her legs 'sweet potatoes' and 'delicious calves.'
Horizons Hotel., 831 F. Supp. at 12 n.5.
194. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 880 (D. Minn. 1993). The court
could hardly have been more dear in stating that sexual harassment can be founded
on expression. As part of its analysis, the court observed that
Eveleth Mines' work environment was characterized by verbal statements
and language reflecting a sexualized, male-oriented, and anti-female atmosphere. Language at Eveleth Mines was generally coarse; both men and
women cursed and used words with a sexual referent. Strikingly, however,
only men went further and used language either (1) referring to women
generally in terms of their body parts, and/or (2) directing comments to or
about specific women and their sex lives, induding proposing sexual relationships and discussing sexual exploits. Related to this second variety of
language was the use of 'pet names' and terms that persons in romantic relationships might use, e.g., 'honey' or 'babe.'
Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 880.
195. SeeUWM Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp 1163, 1167 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
196. Browne, supra note 8, at 483.
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moving to allow this claim. 197 In so doing, they appear to conflict with
those courts that rejected the collegiate hate speech codes as being unconstitutional.
IV. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS

My point is not that the courts were wholly unjustified in overturning collegiate hate codes while upholding sexual harassment law."'
I know, in some sense, that I am arguing against conventional legal
wisdom which holds that any of the preceding four explanations could
have defended the distinction between hate codes and sexual harassment. But I want to suggest that the courts' explanations are hardly
ironclad and that there may be other more veiled bases for these decisions. More to the point, I think this whole enterprise illustrates the
role of the courts as political institutions. Whether influenced by the
persistence of organized litigants, acting on their own to address cultural or social concerns, or responding to changing public opinion, the

courts were doing more than simply "applying the law" in upholding
sexual harassment claims and rejecting collegiate hate speech codes.
The concept that courts are political institutions is hardly new,
although it contrasts sharply with the long-held traditional model of
adjudication that posits "a detached and dispassionate judge arriving at
objective conclusions through the application of neutral rules."' 9 Over
the years many theorists have criticized the traditional model, seeing it
as incomplete or naive."' The line stretches at least as far back as legal
realism and continues to the present day with critical legal studies and
critical race theory.20 ' My intent is not to choose among the various

197. In California, for example, the state Court of Appeals has concluded that the
"continued use of racist epithets in the workplace... create[s] an abusive work envi-

198.
199.
200.

201.

ronment, [and] does not violate the constitutional proscription against prior
restraints...." Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, No. A069353 (Cal. Ct. App.
filed May 21, 1996).
Indeed, as I have suggested, the Doe and UWM Post courts were correct in finding
that university administrators overreached in the application of their codes.
PATRICIA SMITH, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 211 (1993); see JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HARoLD J. SPETH, THE SuPREME COURT AND THE ATITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
See KARL LLEWEUYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAw AND ITS STUDY (1951);
GEaLD N. ROSENBERG, THm HoLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABotrr SocAL.
CHANGE? 342 (1991).
See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRmTIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); LLEWELLYN,
supra note 200.
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alternatives, but rather to suggest that their common theme is correct:
"treating courts and judges as either philosophers on high or as existing

solely within a self-contained legal community ignores what they actually do." 20 2 Courts "must be treated as [the] political institutions [they

are] and studied as such."" 3
What does it mean to say that courts are political institutions? It
should not imply that judges are equivalent to politicians, making decisions to please particular constituencies or blatantly ignoring
precedent to impose their own preferences. It does mean, however,
that courts operate in a political environment and are open to political
pressures. Among other things, judges may reflect the ideologies of the
politicians who appoint them; they may bring certain biases to the
cases; they may broker voting coalitions among their brethren; or they
may be attuned to the effects of their decisions and the public's acceptance of their legitimacy.
This depiction not only better explains what courts do, but in the
case of sexual harassment law and hate speech codes, it more accurately
describes the courts' divergent treatment. Here, I postulate four different theories that explain the courts' motives. First, in a more
dispassionate way, the courts may simply have responded to a better
organized group of litigants in supporting sexual harassment law and
rejecting campus speech codes. Second, whether acting on their own
conservative agenda or reacting to the public mood, the courts may
have rebuffed collegiate hate codes as a way of retarding the "political
correctness" movement. Third, the courts' preference for sexual harassment law over hate speech codes may reflect their desire to keep
sexuality out of public life, and with it, women too. Finally, to the ex-

tent that sexual harassment law is about gender protection, it may be
that the courts themselves--or the public at large-believe women still
deserve legal help but that racial minorities no longer merit similar
protection.
A quick perusal of these theories shows some to be complementary and others exclusive. For example, it is possible that the courts
were egged on by advocates who simultaneously pushed to protect sexual harassment law and oppose political correctness. Conversely, it
seems unlikely that courts would adopt sexual harassment restrictions
to return women to private life, while at the same time offering

202. ROSENBERG, supranote 200, at 342.
203. ROSENBERG, supra note 200, at 342.
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women legal help when they venture out into the workplace. That
these approaches overlap and intertwine should not be seen as a weakness to my approach. I do not intend to offer the definitive answer for
why courts treat sexual harassment law and hate speech codes differently. Rather, I argue that traditional legal analysis does not answer
this question and that we need to search elsewhere for answers. My
postulations, then, should be seen for what they are: a first step in reconsidering this question.
A. PowerofAdvocates
In his recent book, Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy, Samuel Walker argues that American law is shaped by the
strength and resolve of interest groups who are willing to repeatedly
advance their positions in court.2" The courts, after all, cannot choose
which issues they hear, and the decisions that follow depend in some
part on the willingness of various litigants to raise them. To the extent
that an idea has "a vigorous and effective advocate," it stands a better
chance of ultimately prevailing than if its litigants are only tepidly supportive.2°' As Walker says:
Freedom of speech for unpopular ideas did not become a
living reality until the middle of the twentieth century. Although that protection was ultimately the result of a series of
Supreme Court decisions, we must ask what caused the
Court to change. The American Civil Liberties Union was a

critical advocate for free speech for the unpopular. The
ACLU was the lone champion of free speech through the
1920s and early 1930s and filed briefs in -all the major cases
through which the Court fashioned the body of modern First
Amendment law. The perspective here shifts our focus away
from the Court, now seen more as a reactive agent, and toward the advocates who brought the cases and arguments
before it.2

204.

6

SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY

15 (1994).
205. See WALKER, supranote 204, at 15.
206. WALKER, supranote 204, at 14-15.
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Walker's theory is consistent with several other findings in public
law. Over the past thirty years,
judicial scholars have found that litigant status does provide
one explanation for the variation found in [the Supreme
Court's] decisions to grant writs of certiorari.... Additionally, a number of studies have found litigant status to be
significantly related to outcomes on the merits in the lower
courts .... Most of these studies draw on the theoretical
premise ... that 'repeat players' are more likely than 'one

shot' players to be successful in the courts.0 7
This analysis may help to explain the divergence between sexual
harassment law and collegiate hate codes. Sexual harassment litigation
has a long history of organized feminist support. As Stephen Morewitz
explains in his book, Sexual Harassment & Social Change In American
Society, sexual
harassment
law developed out of the burgeoning
,
208
women s movement. As women began to "see their situations as political and institutional rather than as personal, idiosyncratic
dilemmas," they spurned "the biological and social assumptions of sexual harassment." 20 9 With the support of the National Organization for

Women (NOW) and the Women's Legal Defense Fund (WLDF), litigants have come forward to challenge sexual advances on the job and
the hostile environments in which they work. Success has only brought
more success. Early victories gave others the confidence and motivation to begin to make formal sexual harassment claims against their
own coworkers or supervisors. 210
These litigants also found an ally in the EEOC. Under current
employment law, an individual first registers her complaint with the
EEOC, which investigates the merits of her charge. 1 If it finds a likely

207. Reginald S. Sheehan, GovernmentalLitigants, Underdogs,and Civil Liberties:A Reassessment of a Trend in Supreme Court Decision-making, 45 W. POL. Q. 27 (1992).
Other recent studies show that amici are also influential in affecting decisions of the
Supreme Court. See Gregg Ivers & Karen O'Connor, Friendsas Foes: The Amicus CuriaeParticipationandEffectiveness of the American CivilLiberties Union andAmericans
for Effective Law Enforcement in CriminalCases, 9 Lw & PoL'Y 161 (1987).
208. Movawrrz, supra note 23, at 222-23.
209. MoRa
-z,supra note 23, at222-23.
210. See Mortwrrz,supra note 23, at 222-23.
211. See generally, LAwYas COOPERATrVE PUBLSHING, HandlingSexual HarassmentCases
(1993).
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violation of Title VII, the EEOC has the right to prosecute the case in
court, where it becomes a valuable organizational ally. The EEOC has
the experience and resources to effectively litigate the matter, and its
status may well carry certain weight in the courts. As many studies
have demonstrated, federal agencies have "overwhelming success"
when appearing before the federal courts. 2 These studies indicate that
federal agencies win over two-thirds of the cases in which they partici213
pate.
The power of such organizational support-whether from legal
advocacy groups like WLDF, or from governmental agencies like the
EEOC-should not be underestimated in measuring the courts' recognition of sexual harassment claims. Given that sexual harassment
was once "so routinely considered normal," 214 it has taken repeated,
organized litigation to convince courts of the seriousness of sexual harassment and the need for judicial action.
By the same analysis, it is hardly surprising that the courts have

failed to recognize the constitutionality of collegiate speech codes. Not
only were their advocates less organized and committed, but the codes
themselves faced powerful opposition in the courts.
Samuel Walker argues that the codes had a powerful coalition of
supporters on university campuses, where
African American and Hispanic American groups ... have
been able to forge effective coalitions with women's groups,
gay and lesbian groups, groups of physically disabled students, and so on. In addition, they can count on the active
support of organized left-wing white students and the passive
support of many other unaffiliated students: white, male,
heterosexual, politically moderate, and so on.
Walker may be right about the genesis of university hate codes,
but contrary to other reports in the popular press, it is questionable
that the codes' true authors were passionately attached to them.2 ' 6 As
an initial matter, the codes can probably be traced to a growing group
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See Sheehan, supranote 207, at 27.
See Sheehan, supranote 207, at 27.
Estrich, supra note 13, at 860.
WALKER, supra note 204, at 16.
For a more detailed review of this issue, see Jon Gould, Symbolic Speech: Legal Mobilization and the Rise of Collegiate Hate Speech Codes (on file with author, publication
forthcoming 2000).

1999]

THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH REGULATION

of scholars studying critical race theory. Developed in the early 1980s,
critical race theory was led by such faculty as Mari Matsuda, Richard
Delgado, Charles Lawrence, and Kimberle Crenshaw. These scholars
called for a reexamination of legal doctrines that deliberately or indirecdy disadvantaged people of color, arguing that the "dominant
conceptions" of law had become "increasingly incapable of providing
any meaningful quantum of racial justice." 217 Together, they advocated
university speech codes as a way to prevent the kind of racial harassment that hurts students of color. Richard Delgado, in particular, was
one of the authors of Wisconsin's hate speech rule.
While critical race scholars were theoreticians, they were not political activists. Their greatest influence was in providing the
philosophical support for speech codes. Any traditional activism came
from students, a group hardly responsible for defending the codes
should they be challenged in court. The legal defense fell to university
administrators, who had institutional responsibility for the codes and
to whom the courts turned to defend their policies. At each of the universities where codes were challenged (Michigan, Wisconsin, Stanford,
and Central Michigan) the legal defense team was a joint venture between university presidents, deans, law professors and both general and
outside counsels.
Yet their defense seems to have been half-hearted. While each
school answered for its code at the trial level, only one university,
Central Michigan, appealed the initial adverse ruling.218 Michigan revised its code, and Wisconsin considered a new one, but neither school
chose to defend its policies at the appellate level. Stanford's strategy is
perhaps the most perplexing, since it was turned down by a state trial
court, a decision that hardly carries significant weight on a constitutional issue. If Stanford's administrators felt strongly about their
policy, or for that matter if Michigan or Wisconsin had been solidly
attached to their hate speech codes, they almost assuredly would have
appealed the trial courts' decisions. That only one school took this tack
casts significant doubt on their commitment to the codes.
, It is quite possible, as some have suggested, that the codes were
only intended as a symbolic statement by university administrators to

217. Charles tK Lawrence et al., Introduction in WORDS
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE

THAT WOUND: CRmIcAL RACE

FiRsT AMENDMENT 1, 3 (Mari J. Matsuda et

al. eds., 1993).

218. As it had at the trial level, Central Michigan University lost its appeal. See Dambrot
v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995).
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show passing concern for students of color. 19 It is also curious that the
courts' decisions-and the resulting failure of each university to appeal
the unfavorable rulings-were met with little protest on campus. Perhaps the codes never had the high level of support estimated by the
popular media. Perhaps, even supporters had only intended the codes
as a symbolic statement-in this case, as a vehicle to highlight their
concern over a receding national interest in civil rights. In either case,
it is abundantly clear that the codes did not have the same level of
committed support that Title VII did.
What's more, the universities were in the difficult position of
playing defense against an organized opposition. Contrary to the experience of sexual harassment litigants, the universities were not joined
by any legal advocacy groups, nor did the EEOC enter the litigation

on their behalf. Rather, the universities found themselves pitted
against an unbending wall of attorneys affiliated with the American
Civil Liberties Union and the Individual Rights Foundation. 2 0 Given
the ACLU's history as "a vigorous and effective advocate," 22' it is not
all that surprising that they would have prevailed over universities who
were "one shot players," half-heartedly defending their own speech
policies.
B. Judges'Ideology

There is a long line of political science research that suggests a
judge's decisions can be predicted by the ideology of the executive who
appoints him,2n the judge's background,2 or the judge's own ideology
and values.24 In the case of the hate speech codes, all three may have
come into play in overturning these campus rules.

219. See Frederick Schauer, The Sociology of the Hate Speech Debate,37 VILL. L. REV. 805
(1992).
220. The ACLU brought the case in Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp 852
(E.D. Mich. 1989) and assisted in UWMPost v. BoardofRegents, 774 F. Supp 1163,
1167 (E.D. Wis. 1991). Attorneys affiliated with the Individual Rights Foundation

assisted in Corry v. Stanford Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. ffled Feb. 27, 1995).
221. WALKER, supra note 204, at 15.
222. See Neal C. Tate, PersonalAttributeModels ofthe Voting Behavior ofthe U.S. Supreme
CourtJustices,75 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 355, 360-61 (1981).
223. See generally AMERICAN COURT SYMSMS: READINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds. 1978).
224. See generally SECAL & SPAETH, supranote 199.
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We begin with the ideology of the Nixon, Reagan, and Bush administrations, who appointed half of the judges who considered the
speech codes and a majority of the Supreme Court that decided
R.A. V.2 President Reagan, and to a lesser extent Presidents Bush and
Nixon, "focused on the courts and the judicial system to institutionalize further its New Rightist and neoconservative policies. " 226 In the case
of Reagan, he "appointed more than half of the 743 federal judges
then seated, more appointments than any recent predecessor has made
to the federal bench."2 7 The judges were chosen only after "close
ideological inspection," a fact that Edwin Meese, Reagan's former Attorney General and Counselor, confirms in his memoirs.=8 Says
Meese, "if the [liberal social agenda] problems we confronted had
come about because of judges, then something had to be done about
the judges.... Accordingly, the selection of judicial personnel and
reform of the judiciary became and remained important priorities of
the administration."22'
If, in fact, these judges were ideological clones, we might well expect that they and their Republican brethren would reflect the
ideological positions of the Reagan/Bush Administration in many of
their decisions. There is hardly room in an Article of this scope to consider the various ideologies of Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Nixon,

but we can say with certainty that many conservatives were preoccupied with the "political correctness" controversy in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. To the extent that they linked speech codes with the burgeoning debate over "PC," it is entirely possible that a conservative
federal judiciary might have reacted against the codes to quell the social and cultural challenges they saw embodied in the PC movement.
A definition of political correctness depends in large part on the
ideology of the person you ask. To some, PC was a "McCarthyism of
the left," a frontal assault on time-honored principles of Western Civi-

.225. Judge Avern Cohen, who decided Doe, was appointed by President Carter;, Judge
Robert Warren in UWMPost was nominated by President Nixon; Judge Robert Cleland in Dambrotwas named by President Bush; and Judge Peter Stone, the California
state judge in Cony, was appointed by Governor Jerry Brown. Justices Scalia,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas were appointed by Presidents Reagan and
Bush.
226. Ziu.tA- R. EiSENSTEIN, THE Famc a BODY AND THE LAw 152 (1988).
227. EISENsTEIN, supra note 226, at 160.
228. See EDWIN MEESE III, WrrH REAGAN 316-20 (1992).
229. MEEsE, supra note 228, at 316.
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lization 2 To others, it represented a healthy questioning of assumed
truths, particularly those based on white and/or male perspectives.2 ' A

Lexis/Nexis search from 1986-1992 finds 4,253 articles that addressed
political correctness, a distinct sign of its contentiousness. It is hardly
an overstatement to say that PC became the conservatives' demon.
Columnists like George Will, William Safire, Charles Krauthammer,
and pundit/entertainer Rush Limbaugh all took aim at the "dangerous
PC trend."2 2 Public figures like William Bennett, Lynne Cheney, and
even President George Bush attacked what they saw as liberal orthodoxy emanating from America's campuses.2"
Moreover, hate speech codes became symptomatic of the "PC
craze." At a speech at the University of Michigan, President Bush lamented that, "[I]ronically, on the 200th anniversary of our Bill of
Rights, we finch free speech under assault throughout the United
States, including on some college campuses."" Bush's view was shared
by many within the mainstream press, most of whom connected PC to
collegiate hate codes. A short summary of headlines from the early
1990s provides ample illustrations: "'Political Correctness' Has Campuses Debating Free Speech Anew";3 5 "Bush & P.C.-A Conspiracy
So Immense ... ,,;236 "It Certainly Is Crazy, But Is It Really Politically
Incorrect?"; 237 "Free Speech tilts With Political Correctness"; 23 8 "Two
Words-'Water Buffalo'-Start Political Correctness Debate at

230. See DINESH D'SouzA, ILLI3ERAL EDUCATION: THE PouTIcs o RACE & SEX ON
CAMPus 195 (1991).
231. See Reed Way Dasenbrock, We've Done It To Ourselves: The Critiqueof Truth and the
Attack on Theory, in PC WARs: POLMCS AND THEORY IN THE ACADEMY (Jeffrey
Williams ed., 1995).
232. See, e.g., George Will, CurdledPolitics on Campus, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991, at 72;
William Safire, Linguistically Correct, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at
18; Charles Krauthammer, Annals ofPoliticalCorrectness, WASH. PosT, Feb. 8, 1991,
atA19; Richard CorlissA Man,A Legend.A What?, TIME, Sept. 23, 1991, at 65.
233. See Bush Speaks on Academic Freedom, UPI, May 5, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI file.
234. Bush Speaks on Academic Freedom, supranote 233.
235. PoliticalCorrectnessHas Campuses DebatingFree Speech Anew, Reuters, Apr. 11, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters fie.
236. Bush & P. C-A ConspiracySo Immense.... THE NATION, May 27, 1991, at 687.
237. Mike Royko, It Certainly Is Crazy, But Is It Really Politically Incorrect?, ST. Louis
POST-DIsPATcH, May 10, 1994, at 3D.
238. Bill Marrel & Barbara Kessler, Free Speech Tilts with PoliticalCorrectness, ST. Louis
POsT-DISPATCH, May 10, 1994 at 11B.
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Penn";2 9 "An Incident at Stanford Sparks More Dialogue on 'PC'
Speech." 20
With both the political and cultural climates embroiled in the PC
battle, it is not surprising that the courts would also enter the debate.
After all, the collegiate speech codes were pushed by scholars who demanded a reexamination of American law, and their agenda might
have caught the courts' attention. That said, I am unclear which of two
factors would have motivated them. It might be that judges were personally worried about the influence of PC and that they took it upon
themselves to block collegiate speech codes. It might also be that the
courts were aware of growing political or social opposition to political
correctness and that they responded to public opinion in rejecting hate
speech codes. In either case, though, we might explain the courts'

divergent treatment of speech codes by their concern for political correctness.
The problem with this theory is that it is difficult to prove-at
least as far as showing a link between public opinion and judicial action. We know that political and social climates affect courts, 24 2 and
that constitutional norms change as attitudes of the time shift.2 3 Beyond these connections, however, the rest of the analysis is likely to be
theoretical. Few polls have tested the public's opposition to political
24
correctness, and the most visible is methodologically suspect. Part of
the difficulty is the lack of a clear definition for political correctness.
The term has become an open container of sorts for the cultural demands or fears of various groups. 245 What we need are data showing a
239. Dale Russakoff, "Two Words-'Water Buffalo'--Start PoliticalCorrectness Debate at
Penn,"WAsH. POST, May 1, 1993, atA6.
240. Ken Myers, 'IAn Incident at Stanford Sparks More Dialogue on 'PC'Speech," NAT'L

Ltw J., Mar. 3, 1992, at 40.
241. The "public" here need not be seen as the general public. It is possible that the courts
were responding to the views of opinion leaders-politicians, journalists, and civil
libertarian scholars.
242. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious ConstitutionalDoubts: The Supreme Court'
Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAvis L. Rsv. 3

(1996).
HUMAN JURISPRUDENCE: PUBLIC LAw As POLITICAL Sci(1975).
244. In conjunction with MTV, USA Today polled 891 young adults between 16 and 29
to gauge their views on "political correctness." The results were inconclusive. See
Karen Peterson, PoliticalCorrectness Goes Too Far,Not FarEnough, USA TODAY, Feb.
2, 1994, at 1OD.
245. For example, a variety of pollsters have suggested a connection between the angry
white male voter of 1994 and his resentment towards political correctness, but even
243. See
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rise in public opposition to political correctness and a resulting shift in
the courts against hate speech codes. While the latter is clear, the former is more indirect. We can trace a trend against PC among opinion
leaders, but their opposition must be seen as either reflective of the
public's mood or an antecedent influence. Alternatively, we might consider a change to the theory of judicial behavior. Perhaps courts
respond to the views of opinion leaders and not simply the general
public. I leave that question for another day.
However, we need not let these methodological challenges frustrate us, for there is better evidence that the Supreme Court's own
opposition to PC motivated its rejection of hate speech rules. Reading
the Court's decision in R.A. V, and surveying the justices' comments
since then, it seems likely that they were sending a signal about PC
when they overturned St. Paul, Minnesota's hate crime statute. Further, when one considers that the judges in Dambrot and Corry based
their decisions extensively on R.A. V, the justices' opinions have had a
much wider influence in distinguishing hate speech from sexual harassment.
In the RA. V decision, Justice Blackmun offered one of the most
telling explanations for the majority's holding. Like the other three
justices who concurred, Blackmun could not accept the majority's rationale for upholding sexual harassment litigation while overturning
hate speech legislation. But unlike his brethren, Blackmun put the dilemma in plain terms. As he said:
[There] is the possibility that this case... will be regarded as
an aberration-a case where the Court manipulated doctrine
to strike down an ordinance whose premise it opposed,
namely that racial threats and verbal assaults are of greater
harm than other fighting words. I fear that the Court has been
distractedfrom itsproper mission by the temptation to decide the
issue over "politicallycorrect speech" and "culturaldiversity,"
neither of which is presentedhere. If this is the meaning of today's opinion, it is perhaps even more regrettable. 246

here they cannot agree on what issues or themes comprise PC. See Male Call at the
Polls. Analysts Say RecentElections HighlightAngry White Men's Power in Politics, DALI.AS MORMNG NEws, Dec. 28, 1994, at 1A.
246. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 415-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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Blackmun is not the only person-to suggest that the R.A.V decision was directed against PC. The first commentators on the case
offered a similar analysis. As the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported, political correctness "never appeared in Justice Antonin Scalia's decision
on Monday striking down a hate-speech law from St. Paul ... [b]ut
legal scholars said Tuesday that Scalia's opinion was clearly aimed at
the proliferating state laws, municipal ordinances and campus codes
aimed at racist, sexist and anti-Semitic speech." 247 Added Steven
Shapiro of the ACLU, "[tihis decision was clearly written in the larger
political context in which the conservative wing 2of the court is con11
cerned about the political correctness movement.
As he had done through much of the PC debate, Charles Krauth-

ammer jumped in to offer his own analysis. Explaining the decision, he
said:
The St. Paul opinion represents yet another battle in [Justice]
Scalia's continuing campaign against group rights. [When it
comes to offering] members of preferred groups ... special
protection from verbal or symbolic injury, Scalia has long
tried to deter the state from making these kinds of hierarchical distinctions among the citizenry. [Justice Blackmun
charges] Scalia with using this case to attack "politically correct speech." Scalia's opinion will, no doubt, chill the current
ardor on campus for politically correct speech codes....
Scalia has indeed taken aim at political correctness. He is to

be commended for it.249
Understandably, one might question the impartiality of Krauthammer or the ACLU, since each had an interest in extending the
Court's message beyond the four corners of R.A. V Krauthammer had
been crusading against PC for up to a year at the time of R.A. V, and
the ACLU had also represented the plaintiff in Doe and wanted to
confirm that collegiate speech codes were now a dead letter. Nevertheless, scholars and observers on various sides of the spectrum all saw the
R.A. V decision as rooted in concerns about political correctness.

247. William H. Freivogel, RulingAimed at Hate-Speech Laws, ST. Lois POST-DIsPATCi,
June 24, 1992, at 1C.
248. Freivogel, supra note 247 at IC.
249. Charles Krauthammer, PoliticalCorrectnessis Scalia'sNewest Target, Cm. Sun-TIMEs,
June 27, 1992, at 21.
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Appearing on the MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, Professors Charles Fried
and Lawrence Tribe of Harvard Law School (two ideological opposites) both agreed that the R.A. V decision was "going to have an effect
on campuses which have passed these so-called 'politically correct restrictions."', 5 0 Fried said that Scalia's opinion would affect the policies
of places such as Stanford, Michigan, and Wisconsin, where "certain
kinds of speech are banned because they upset people who belong to
certain categories," 251 but other equally offensive kinds of speech are
not banned.

It is not at all surprising that the Court would premise its hate
speech decision on concerns of PC. The lawyer who represented the
plaintiff in R.A. V chose an argument which made "the connection

between [St. Paul's] ordinance and the attempts to frame 'politically
correct' speech codes on college campuses." 2 2 But he had more than a
receptive court. Since the decision, individual justices have given hints

of their concerns for political correctness. In speeches at major universities, both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas have decried
the influence of PC. Addressing a commencement ceremony at George
Mason University, Rehnquist alluded "to disputes on numerous college campuses over 'politically correct speech.' ,,253 The Chief Justice
continued, "'[o]n occasion, one senses that [for] some universities today ...there is an orthodoxy or sort of party line from which one

departs at one's peril." 2" So, too, Justice Thomas has "complained that
'a new brand of stereotypes and ad hominem assaults are surfacing
across the nation's college campuses, in the national media, in Hollywood and among the ... "cultural elite"' aimed at 'those who dare to
disagree with the latest ideological fad.' ,211

But it is Justice Scalia who reserves the most enmity for political
correctness. As Krauthammer noted, the R.A.V decision may have
been part of Scalia's ongoing battle to chill the nation's ardor for political correctness. 2" Certainly, his dissents since then have hardly
250. MacVeil/LehrerNewshour(PBS television broadcast, June 26, 1992).
251. MacNeil/LehrerNewshour (PBS television broadcast, June 26, 1992).
252. GaryJeffreyJacobsohn, In Defense ofa Cross-Burner,WASH. POST,Nov. 21, 1994,

C2 (reviewing EDWARD J.
253.
254.
255.
256.

CERY,BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS

at

(1994) (a book by

the plaintiffs lawyer, Edward Cleary, in which he boasts of the arguments his team
used to interest the Court)).
Schools Must Test Ideas, RehnquistSays, L.A. TiMEs, May 23, 1993 at Al2.
Schools Must Test Ideas, RehnquistSays, supra note 253, at Al2.
Michael Kinsley, Right-WingP.C.Is StillP.C., TIME, Aug. 9, 1993 at 66.
See Krauthammer, supra note 249, at 21.
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masked his disdain for PC. In a 1994 case holding that gender may not

be a basis for jury selection, a "sarcastic Antonin Scalia ...ridiculed
the Court's majority for its political correctness. 'Unisex is unquestionably in fashion,"' he declared.257 Scalia's behavior did not escape
other journalists. Even the Washington Times noted the mockery with
which Scalia accused "the majority of politically correct
'anti-male-chauvinist oratory' and flawed reasoning." 258 It is hardly a
leap to imagine that his opinion of political correctness would have
influenced his decision on the related issue of collegiate hate speech.
Moving back from the Supreme Court to the lower courts, there
may be other issues besides political correctness that affected their decisions on speech codes. Again, we are aided by public law research,
which posits that the personal attributes of individual judges influence
their decisions.2 This is most applicable in the Doe case, where Judge
Avern Cohn had been an attorney with the ACLU before joining the
bench. In a law review article after the case, Judge Cohn even speaks of
his
long association with the American Civil Liberties Union in
the years before I took the bench. ACLU furnished counsel
for the plaintiff in Doe. When I returned to Detroit in 1950
to begin practicing law I became a cooperating attorney with
the ACLU and handled several matters for it in the 1960s

....[During that time], I received a good deal of publicity
for a speech I made castigating the Michigan State Senate for
attempting to financially punish universities because of a dislike of certain campus speakers .... If one believes in
predestination, it is more than coincidence that Doe v. The
University of Michigan ended up on my docket in May
1989.260

There are, of course, several ways to interpret Judge Cohn's writings. It could be, as he says, that "these antecedents" merely sensitized
him "to the tensions on college campuses regarding First Amendment
257. ABC News: Supreme Court Rules on Jury Gender Discrimination (ABC television
broadcast, Apr. 19, 1994).
258. Nancy E. Roman, High CourtRestricts ShapingJuries,Rules Sex Cannotbe a Factorin
Choices, WAsH. Timus, Apr. 20, 1994, at Al.
259. See generally GoLDMAN & SARAT, supra note 223; SciAs. & SPAET, supra note 199.
260. Avern Cohn, Doe v. University ofMichigan:A Somewhat PersonalView, 37 WAYNE L.
Rnv. 1313, 1314 (1991).
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matters. " m' But it is also possible that Judge Cohn came to the case
with a decision already in mind, that his own ideology predetermined
the result, or that his past association with plaintiffs counsel unfairly
tilted the case against the university's speech code.
Judge Cohn's background raises one more point that merits consideration. One cannot ignore the fact that the judges making these
decisions are not only white, but they attended college at a very different time than the period in which the speech codes were adopted.
Most of the judges graduated college in the 194 0s or 1950s, a period
in which few minorities attended college, let alone felt free to fight
harassment against them on campus (or elsewhere). Thirty years later,
nearly seventeen percent of college students were non-white,262 and
minority students felt empowered to organize for their own interests.
Affirmative action had succeeded in allowing more minority students
to go to college, but it also created conflicts between affluent white
students who came from homogenous schools and communities, and
the more diverse student body they found on many college campuses.263 That minority students (or faculty) sought speech codes to
protect themselves from "ethno-violence"2" might very well have been
lost on a judiciary that came of age in a different time. This is not to
say that older judges cannot grow with the times (witness Justice
Blackmun), but one has to consider that the Doe, UWM Post, Dambrot
and Corry courts were all setting legal rules for an educational environment that no longer existed.

C.Limiting Sexuality

A different theory turns the analytical tables in explaining the
courts' behavior. Under this approach Doe and its progeny are not the
anomaly; instead sexual harassment law becomes the exception. The
argument requires a few steps: because harassment cases generally turn
on questions of sexuality, not gender, and given both Congress' and

261. Cohn, supra note 260, at 1314.
262. See ALEXANDER ASTIN ET AL., THE AMERICAN FRESHMAN: NATIONAL NoRms FOR
FALL 1998 47 (1998).
263. See Jon Wiener, Reagan's Children:RacialHatredon Campus, THE NATION, Feb. 27,
1989, at 260.
264. This term is borrowed from the Center for Applied Study of Ethnoviolence. It is an
all-encompassing phrase, referring to violence against groups defined by race, gender,
ethnicity, or sexual orientation.
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the courts' initial reluctance to recognize discrimination claims, it may
be that a relatively prudish judiciary has limited harassment law to ferreting out sexually oriented conduct in the workplace. Hate speech
rules, thus, had no chance at judicial recognition since the harassment
law on which they were based is limited largely to cases of sexual behavior or expression.
This hypothesis begins with the recognition that Title VII was
passed almost by accident, and that the inclusion of "sex" as a protected basis was a strategic miscalculation by its opponents. 265 Over
time, the courts have extended Title VII to cover instances of sexual
harassment, but even here many of the fact patterns seem to turn on
questions of sex not gender. Lindemann and Kadue rightly note that
"the essence of sexual harassment is gender discrimination," yet they
also recognize that many courts have been misled by the federal regulations into believing that "the predicate acts underlying a sexual
harassment claim must be sexual in nature."266 Some go even further.
As Ruth Colker contends, "women who are presumed to be heterosexual ... frequently prevail if can they show that they have been

but nonsexualized conduct
sexualized; merely showing 26gender-based
7
...is usually not sufficient.,

Perhaps the courts should not be faulted for grounding sexual
harassment on sexual, rather than gender-based conduct, as they have
faced a number of outside commentators urging them to do just this.
The EEOC's own test, for example, premises liability on "conduct of a

sexual nature."26' Furthermore, a number of feminist theorists have
justified the claim on its sexual nature. Catharine MacKinnon, for example, has argued that sexual harassment should be defined according
to its "unwanted imposition of sexual requirements .... But even
with such urgings, the courts were not obliged to take outside advice.
Why, then, would they choose to premise harassment claims on sexu-

265. One day before a House vote on the Civil Rights Act, proponents of Tide VII
amended the legislation to add "sex" as a protected basis. They did so with the help
of Tide VII's opponents, "who hoped that the inclusion of 'sex' would highlight the
absurdity of the effort as a whole, and contribute to its defeat." Estrich, supra note
13, at 816-17.
266. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supranote 7, at 30, 173.
267. Ruth Colker, Whores, Fags, Dumb-Ass Women, Surly Blacks and CompetentHeterosexual White Men: The Sexual and Racial Morality Underlying Anti-Discrimination
Doctrine,7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 196-97 (1995).
268. SExUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS, supranote 52, at 137.
269. CATHAINE A. MAcKINNON, SExUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979).
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ality rather than gender (or even other bases)? Here, there are three
possibilities. First, it may be that the courts reflect an American prudishness over sexuality. Many observers contend that America's sexual
mores are more puritanical than those of other western societies. Notwithstanding the prevalence of movies and television programs with
sexual themes, we are said to be less comfortable with personal sexuality and with public displays of sexuality. Certainly, the conservative
campaigns over obscenity and pornography reflect a cultural willingness
to restrain public sexuality," and the federal judiciary has also been
drifting more conservatively over the last fifteen years. 27' Considering,
then, that Title VII claims arise in the workplace, it may be that the
courts have stepped in against sexual displays on the shop floor.272

At the same time, the courts' endorsement of sexual harassment
law may reflect their attitudes towards women, and in particular the
rise of women who work outside the home. This explanation finds its
basis in social change of the 1970s as women began to enter the work
force in greater numbers. But rather than being seen as equal col-

leagues, many women were greeted with a spate of harassment from
their male coworkers. At this point, the courts had a choice to make:
would they allow the men's conduct to continue, or would they step in
to guarantee women equal opportunity in the workplace? Recent history tells us that the courts did endorse sexual harassment law, but

their decisions do not necessarily mean that judges saw women as
equals. Instead, the courts may have considered women as "the weaker
270. These drives, including especially Attorney General Edwin Meese's Task Force on
Pornography, are to be contrasted with feminist campaigns like those of Catharine
MacKinnon to eradicate pornography. While the former are driven by a moral revulsion to certain sexual behavior, the latter maintain that pornography and the like
represent sexual servitude for women. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights & Speech, 20 HAmv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1985); FINAL REPORTS
Ov THE Aaro.NEY GENERAL'S COMMISION ON POaoGRaPHsY (Rutledge Hill Press,
1986).
271. See EISENSTEIN, supranote 226, at 152.
272. Of course, we cannot ignore American Booksellersv. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th
Cir. 1985), where the Seventh Circuit refused to uphold an Indianapolis antipornography statute championed by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin.
Although many would disagree, I explain this decision on two grounds. First, the
court framed the case as feminist activists getting too "uppity," rather than a statute
that protected "average" women. Second, instead of considering pornography a protected activity, the court left open the question of how dangerous the "secondary
effects" of pornography might be. To the extent that social science research can show
a more direct relationship between pornography and sex crimes, the Seventh Circuit
might be willing to reconsider and uphold the statute.
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sex," a class of workers who needed special protection. We have seen
this approach before in the labor cases of the early twentieth century.
As Muller v. Oregon 273 and its progeny pronounced, women are more
"delicate" than men and need to be protected from harm in the workplace. 274 Admittedly, this is a strange sentiment to confront eighty years
later, and many will undoubtedly question its explanatory power. But
one need only read the feminist literature of the 1990s to see that it
continues to thrive. Even among feminist activists, some accuse others
of "asking to be protected from society.... [They are] just reenforcing society's opinion that all women are victims and need protection." 275 If certain women would think this themselves, the courts'

concurrence should be plausible too.
Others paint an even more pessimistic picture of sexual harassment law. Susan Estrich describes a judiciary indifferent to women's
claims and imbued with sexist notions of "normal" workplace behavior.276 As she says, "if there is one area of social behavior where sexism
is entrenched in law-one realm where traditional male prerogatives
are most protected, male power most jealously preserved, and female
power most jealously limited-it is in the area of sex itself...., 2 r
But what if we take a slightly different approach to Estrich's explanation? Perhaps it's not so much that the courts were trying to
preserve male sexual prerogatives as they were fearful of female power
and consequently female sexuality. Catharine MacKinnon's work
would seem to support this interpretation. Since she first appeared on
the academic scene, MacKinnon has argued that women are socially
defined in sexual terms. Sex and gender are similar concepts, she says,
and an effort by society to limit one realm is the same as affecting the
other. 278 So, too, other feminist scholars have argued that society's fear
of women's sexual independence was the impetus behind anti-women

policies of the 1980s. 279 Drawing on this work, we might consider
whether the courts employed sexual restrictions under Title VII as a
way of returning women to the "private sphere" of the home.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
See JUDMTH A. BAER, TiHE CHAINS OF PROTECTION 66-67 (1978).
Estlund, supranote 8, at 717.
See Estrich, supranote 13, at 860.
Estrich, supra note 13, at 814-15.
See generally MACKINNON, supra note 269; Catharine MacKinnon, Difference and
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination,in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 81 (Katharine T.
Bartlett & Roseanne Kennedy eds. 1991).

279. See, e.g., EISENSTEIN, supra note 226, at 152-90.
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Surprisingly, this view finds support in the writings of Frederick
Engels and John Stuart Mill nearly a century ago. Both describe a
world in which women are defined by their sexuality and limited to
the private space of the family home. According to Mill, men control
women through sex. They define women as submissive sexual objects
and force them into marriage by closing all doors against them. Men
do this, Mill says, because they have a real antipathy to the equal
freedom of women.2"' Adds Engel, "the first condition of the liberation
of the wife is to bring the whole female sex back into public indttry."281
Bringing their discussion forward to the present day, it is possible
that the courts endorsed sexual harassment law as a way of pushing
women back into the private sphere of home life. Granted, the sexual
conduct they bridled was not that of women, but the courts may have
equated such displays with the emergence of women in the work
world. Sex had not previously been part of the workplace, and judges
may have looked at women as the catalyst. In restricting sexual behavior at work, then, the courts may have been sending a message to
women that they belonged back at home.
This view, of course, is hardly novel, as women have often faced
the argument that their place is inside the home and not at work. But
what is so interesting about the courts' adoption of sexual harassment
law is that it came in the late 1970s to mid 1980s just as women were

beginning to enter the workforce again in large numbers. The timing
strikes me as more than coincidental and immediately draws connections to other times in this century when Congress and the courts
adopted protective labor legislation as women took jobs.282 Whether
such rules were designed to protect women or prevent them from
competing with men is still very much an open question, and I leave
its consideration to the reader. Either way, however, the debate continues to highlight the relationship between women's sexuality and
their legal treatment. As one commentator has said, "sexuality... is in
part a social construction... The way we think about sex fashions the
"
way we live it. ,HS

280. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, THE
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).

SUBJECTION OF WOMEN

(Stefan Collini ed.,

281. FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE

137-38 (Eleanor Burke Leacock ed., Int'l Publishers 1972).
282. See Baer, supranote 274.
283. EISENSTEIN, supra note 226, at 157 (citing JEFFREY WEEKs,
CONTENTs 1985).
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D. Gender Wins But Race Loses
Finally, a different theory looks at both the courts' and the public's varying preferences for gender and racial protection. Under this
approach, sexual harassment law wins because it protects women, a
group the courts and/or public consider worthy of legal defense. By
contrast, hate speech codes lose because they are seen as racial preferences, which neither the courts nor public continue to support.
The hypothesis begins by distinguishing the motivations for protections against sexual harassment and collegiate hate speech.
Explaining the former, we say that sexual harassment law developed to
protect women against gender discrimination. This is a bit of a break
from the previous theory, which presumes that harassment law turns
on questions of sexuality, not gender. Regardless of which is correct,
there can be no mistaking that sexual harassment law has been applied
most often to protect women against male aggressors. 284 This is an important point, since its statutory basis, Tide VII, is not limited to
women or sexual harassment. In fact, as argued earlier, Tide VII does
not even mention harassment. Harassment law is a judge-created

claim, and with some notable exceptions, the doctrine is used most
regularly by women who face285discriminatory harassment from their
male colleagues or supervisors.
By contrast, hate speech codes developed out of concerns for a
perceived increase in racial intolerance on college campuses. The
judges who have heard these cases admit as much in their opinions.
Judge Cohn, linked Michigan's rule to "arising tide of racial intolerance and harassment on campus." 2 6 His opinion recites a litany of
racial incidents that took place on the Ann Arbor campus up to the
adoption of the University's hate speech code. 287 During the uproar,

284. See generally LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 7; Moauxvrrz, supra note 23.
285. This is not to say that the law is limited to claims of sexual harassment, or even to
cases of men harassing women. The doctrine did evolve from cases of racial harassment, and the law is still open to such claims. Moreover, several men are just
beginning to bring reverse sexual harassment cases against their female superiors, and
some employees are filing same-sex harassment claims against their gay or lesbian coworkers or supervisors. My point is not that harassment law must be limited to claims
of men harassing women on the basis of sex, but rather that these represent the majority of claims brought and won over the last ten years.
286. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
287. "Unknown persons distributed a flier declaring an 'open season' on blacks"; "a student disc jockey at an on-campus radio station allowed racist jokes to be broadcast";
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"the United Coalition Against Racism, a campus anti-discrimination
group, announced that it intended to file a class action civil rights suit
against the University 'for not maintaining or creating a non-racist,
non-violent atmosphere' on campus. " 211 It was this threat, as well as
the racial incidents themselves, that Judge Cohn says convinced the
University to adopt "a six-point action plan to remedy the racial problems on campus. This included the adoption of 'an anti-racial
harassment policy,'" otherwise known as the university's hate speech
rule. 289

Similarly, Judge Warren's opinion in UWMIPost describes a series
of racial incidents that preceded Wisconsin's speech code. A fraternity
erected a large caricature of a black Fiji Islander at a theme party; a
fight occurred "with racial overtones between members of two fraternities"; and "a fraternity held a 'slave auction' at which pledges in
black face performed skits parroting black entertainers." 20 In response
to "concerns over an increase in incidents of discriminatory harassment, ...

[the University's] Board of Regents adopted 'Design for

Diversity,' a plan to increase minority representation, multi-cultural
understanding and greater diversity throughout the University of Wisconsin System's 26 campuses." 291 As part of this Design, the Regents

also adopted Rule 17.06(2), popularly known as the University's hate
speech rule.292
Michigan and Wisconsin are not anomalies. An academic study
has found that ten of the twenty largest American universities developed speech codes during 1986 to 1991, and the vast majority of these
followed racial incidents that occurred on campus. 2 The incidents
themselves were highly symbolic, with all but a few of the most notorious involving attacks by white students against their black peers. As
such, they became representative of the larger problems faced by black
students and faculty. At many schools black students organized to fight
what they considered a hostile racial climate on their campuses. The
Universities of Massachusetts-Amherst and Michigan, for example,

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

and "a Ku Klux Klan uniform was displayed from a dormitory window... [a]t a
demonstration protesting these incidents." Doe 721 F. Supp. at 854.
Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 854.
Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 853-55.
UWM Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
UWMPost,774 F. Supp. at 1165.
See UWMPost, 774 F. Supp. at 1165.
SeeAcademic Index, supranote 18, at 137.
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were besieged by student activists who took over campus buildings
until they wrangled concessions on student recruitment, faculty diversity and multi-cultural programming. For their part, many university
administrators were concerned at the rise in racial incidents. Apart
from the adverse publicity the incidents generated, administrators were
presiding over a period of decreasing black enrollment, declining black
faculty, and receding national support for affirmative action and civil
rights. The incidents meant that administrators had to do something,
and if only to quiet campus, they were willing to act. Wisconsin's Design for Diversity was only the most prominent university response,
most of which were directed to the problems of black students 2and
'4
faculty. Hate speech codes were a part of these administrative rules.
Up to this point, I have suggested that sexual harassment law de-

veloped as a doctrine to protect women; I have also speculated that
hate speech codes were initiated as a way of defending black students
and faculty. Put more simply, we might say that sexual harassment is
about gender protection, while hate speech rules are about racial protection. Seen this way, it is easier to surmise why judges would support
the former but reject the latter. Not only have the courts shown a
greater willingness of late to enforce gender protection, but a majority
of Americans still believe that civil rights laws are required for women's
equality.2 5 Conversely, the courts have turned away from racial claims,
while fewer Americans believe that blacks continue to merit the same
level of civil rights protection they currently receive.296
I recognize this is tricky ground. I am not suggesting that the
courts, or the American public, have traded sexism for racism. One
cannot, however, ignore changes in the American approach to race and
gender, both in law and public attitudes. Where black litigants regularly won constitutional rights thirty years ago, it is now women who
do better before the Supreme Court. Similarly, where majorities of
Americans used to think that blacks had it worse than women, new

294. See Jon Gould, Symbolic Speech: Legal Mobilization and the Rise of Collegiate Hate
Speech Codes (dissertation slated for upcoming publication by UMI Dissertation
Services).
295. See Diana Collasanto, Public Wants Civil Rights Widened for Some Groups, Notfor
Others, GAULoP POLL MoNTmLY, Dec. 1989, at 15.
296. See C. Gray Wheeler, 30 Years Beyond "I Have a Dream," GALLOP POLL MONTHLY,
Oct. 1993, at 2.
297. See infra text accompanying notes 105-109.
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polling shows greater support of gender over racial protections.298
Given such changes, we cannot ignore the possibility that either sexual
harassment law or collegiate speech codes were interpreted through the
same rubric.
One way to understand this dichotomy is through the idea of
"legal discourses." This term comes from the work of Michael
McCann and refers to the way in which legal claims are introduced
into public debate through varying narratives.299 Over time, these narratives take on a life of their own, to the point that we then categorize
the original claims under different aieas of the law. For example, sexual
harassment claims arose originally in the workplace, depicting cases of
crude male supervisors touching, hassling or making sexual demands
on their female employees. The common theme of these cases was sexual abuse of women, and that narrative influenced the courts to
categorize sexual harassment under the larger tort of sex discrimination. By contrast, the first reports of hate speech codes linked their
adoption to the increasing power of left-wing academics and their
plans to rewrite First Amendment doctrine. Rather than focusing on
the "rise of racial violence" to which the codes were targeted, many
news reports suggested that "these scholars" and the hate speech policies they advocate "go[] against the American grain" on free speech. 00
This narrative carried over to the courts' treatment of collegiate hate
policies, where each court to consider the codes categorized them under the First Amendment and not Title VII. Unlike women, whose
interests the courts were willing to protect, minorities were seen as
over-stepping the Constitution or asking for special treatment with
collegiate hate speech codes.
The same theme can be seen in the courts' treatment of race and

gender. In their book, The Supreme Court,Race and Civil Rights, Abraham Davis and Barbara Luck Graham chronicle the Supreme Court's
treatment of race cases this century.3 ' Like others who follow the

Court, Davis and Graham depict varying alliances of justices who are
sympathetic and responsive to the condition of black Americans.

298. See National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, Univ. Mich. The NES
Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior (last modified Feb. 17, 1999)
<http://www.umich.edul-nes/nesguide/toptablesltab4b_4.htm> [hereinafter NES].
299. See generally MIcuEL W. McCANN,RIGHTS AT WOax (1994).
300. Tamar Jacoby, Time to Outlaw RacialSlurs?, NEWSWEEK, June 6, 1988, at 59.
301. ABRA.mi L. DAVIS & BmwAim LUCK GRAMwd, THE SUPREME COURT, RACE AND
CrvIL RIGHTS (1995).
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However, once the calendar moves to the mid-1980s, some chinks are
seen in the Court's support for civil rights cases. In City ofRichmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., the Court struck down a minority set-aside program.102 In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Court invalidated
an affirmative action plan which protected black teachers over more
senior white instructors. 0 3 And in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
the Court shifted the burden of proof from employer to employee in
discrimination suits.3 4 Similarly, in the area of voting rights, the Court
has been less supportive of black litigants. In Johnson v. DeGrandy, the
Court rejected a dilution suit from black and Hispanic voters, °5 and

over the last two years the Court has thrown out redistricting that tried

to strengthen the representation of black voters. °6
At the same time, the Court has been more supportive, or at least
neutral, on issues of women's rights. Beginning with the Burger Court,
justices "demonstrated a willingness to void any legislative gender discrimination that (in the eyes of the Court) is not designed to
compensate women for disadvantages that they have suffered as a result of societal discrimination ... . 307This is not to suggest that the

Court has embraced women's rights, for, as some commentators have
noted, the Rehnquist Court's treatment of abortion shows a greater
willingness to restrict a woman's right to choose.30 ' Further, in Price

Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court went to unusual lengths to find an
acceptable "business reason" for a woman's demotion.

9

Still, even if

the Court is not an enthusiastic supporter of gender rights, it is hardly
the critic that now haunts race cases. The Court has extended Title VII
to cover cases of sexual harassment, and more recently the justices held
that a criminal statute could be applied to a judge who was convicted
of assaulting and harassing female litigants.310

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

City of Richmond v. J. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Wygant v. Jackson Bd.of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
See Abrams v. Johnson, Nos. 95-1425, 95-1460, 1997 U.S. LFXIS 3863 (Jun. 19,
1997); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).

307. Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Sex and the Burger Court: Recent Judicial Policy Making
Toward Women, in RACE, SEX AND POuCY PROBLEMS 103, 107 (Marian Lief Palley
& Michael Preston eds., 1979).
308. See EisENSTEIN, supranote 226, at 152.
309. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
310. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
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Part of the reason for the Court's deference to women's rights
must go to the presence of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg on the bench. Before becoming a judge, Justice Ginsburg made a career bringing cases of sex discrimination, and her
background shines through in United States v. Virginia (VMI), where
her opinion overturned the all-male program of the Virginia Military
Institute.3 1 The VM1 case is also significant for the constitutional test
the Court used to consider sex discrimination. Traditionally, the Court
has employed a "strict scrutiny" test to consider racial classifications
and an "intermediate scrutiny" test to examine gender classifications
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." '

In VMI, however, the Court invented a new test for gender classifications that closely resembles the strict scrutiny test of race. Said the
Court, Virginia must show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" to
uphold its single-sex policy of military education."' It is especially relevant that the Court applied this test to a case where the state
discriminated against gender; by fashioning a new test so similar to
strict scrutiny, the state's policy is less likely to stand than under the
traditional test of intermediate scrutiny.
By contrast, in the case of affirmative action, where the government discriminates in favor of race or gender, the strict scrutiny
standard makes it more likely that gender and racial preferences will be
found unconstitutional. This distinction makes Adarandv. Pena all the
more important, because the Supreme Court ruled there that strict
scrutiny applies to affirmative action for blacks and other racial minorities.1 4 There are many commentators who believe that Adarand
places gender-based affirmative action in peril,31 but as others point
out, the Court left open the question of the proper constitutional
standard for gender.3 6 In the meantime, the lower courts continue to
311. See United Stares v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
312. Under strict scrutiny, the state must show that the use of the suspect classification
furthers a compelling governmental purpose. See, e.g., University of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978) (Powell, J.,plurality opinion). By contrast, under intermediate scrutiny, "dassifications by gender must serve important governmental

objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
313. VMI, 518 U.S. at 534.
314. SeeAdarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
315. See, e.g., Bryant S. Delgadillo, Do "Skepticism," "Consitency," and "Congruence"
Foreshadowa Color-BlindFuture?, 69 TEMPLE L.R. 1521 (1996).
316. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Berkeley, Gender BasedAffirmative Action: A Journey That Has
OnlyJust Begun, 50 WASH. U. J.Ua. & CONTEMp. L.353 (1996).
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use the intermediate test for gender-based affirmative action, 17 making
its practice easier to uphold than that for racial minorities.
It is difficult to say what has influenced the courts' progression on
race and gender cases. Some commentators have focused on the personal politics of new judges, suggesting that the conservative
appointments of Presidents Reagan and Bush have pushed the courts
to more conservative positions on race cases. 1 s It is also possible, as
mentioned earlier, that the addition of two female justices has sensitized the Supreme Court, and by extension the lower courts, to

questions of gender discrimination. We also, however, ought to look
outside the Court to other influences, for public opinion has turned
upside down on questions of racial or gender preferences.
To most lawyers and traditional legal scholars, the notion that
public opinion influences legal doctrine is anathema. Courts are supposed to be insulated from the general public and immune from
political pressures. As a number of political scientists have shown,
however, judicial "policy responds dynamically to public opinion
change."" 9 Known as dynamic representation theory, this approach
shows that, rather than being isolated from the majority's preferences,
courts "seem to float on the tide of fashions."3 20 Research varies on
whether the courts' response is an immediate, direct, or indirect result
of public opinion or whether there is a delay in the public opinion's
effect on the courts, but all agree that public opinion is an important
predictor of judicial decisions.32'
For this Article I am most interested in American attitudes towards civil rights and whether they influenced the various cases. I
begin with the common conclusion that "America has generally moved
in a liberal direction" since World War II3 2 By "liberal," researchers
generally mean that Americans have become more tolerant, "with
317. See Berkeley, supranote 316, at 354.
318. See, e.g., EISENsTrIN, supranote 226, at 152, 160-62.
Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. ScL Rzv. 543, 543
319. James A. Stimson et al.,

(1995).
supra note 319, at 558.
320. Srimson, et al.,
321. See William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a CountermajoritarianInstitution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87
AM. POL. Sci. Ray. 87, 96 (1993); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Response: Popular Influence on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 716
(1994); Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Comment: PopularInfluence on Supreme
CourtDecisions, 88 AM. POL Sci. Ray. 711 (1994); Stimson et al., supra note 319, at
558-60.
322. SMrrH, supranote 199, at 479.
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equal rights and individualism [experiencing] the most consistent liberal movements."' Even James Davis, one of the luminaries of public
opinion research, concludes that the "overall trend is more liberal than
conservative." 324

An overall trend, however, does not tell us the respective differences in attitudes to women and racial minorities, particularly when
the liberal trend has co-existed with "a period of profound change to
the Right in virtually every area of public policy."3 25 I do not pretend
to explain the oddity of competing liberal and conservative trends, as
scholars more deft than I have been confounded by this "disquieting
disjuncture.
Nevertheless, it is possible that surveyors have been
confusing attitudes towards tolerance with those towards equality. This
is a crucial distinction, since the former measures one's willingness to
passively accept another, while the latter asks what costs the respondent would endure to make another whole.327 Put another way, a
respondent can answer that he is tolerant ("yes, I would accept a black
neighbor"), without necessarily favoring equality ("no, I am unwilling
to fund programs for minorities"). In fact, a prominent national poll
has found that while racial attitudes have changed for the better, the
shift has not been3 accompanied by a change in opinion about the state
of racial equality.

2s

According to the Gallup Organization, Americans are "more ra' For example, only five
cially tolerant now than in the recent past."329
percent of whites in a 1990 survey said they would move out of their
neighborhood if a black family moved next door.330 This number is

323. SMITH, supranote 199, at 479.
324. James A. Davis, Changeable Weather in a Cooling Climate Atop the Liberal Plateau:
Conversion andReplacement in Fory-Two GeneralSocial Survey Items 1972-1989, 56
PUB. OPINION Q. 261, 261 (1992).
325. Cliff Zukin, Comment on Davis: Yes, But... Public Opinion Is a Top-Down Process,
56 PUB. OPINION Q. 311,312 (1992).
326. See Zukin, supranote 325, at 313.
327. I recognize that the surveys do not literally ask these questions. My point is what the
answers to each question reflect about the respondents' true attitudes. Tolerance, by
definition, is a passive activity. However, equality requires that something be affirmatively given to the suppressed to make them equal. It may be rights, money,
education, or another form of "opportunity," but equality implies that the "haves"
will make some effort to assist the "have nots."
328. See George Gallup, Jr. & Larry Hugick, Racial Tolerance Grows, Progress on Racial
EqualityLess Evident, GAU.up PoLL MONTHLY, June 1990, at 23.
329. Gallup & Hugick, supra note 328, at 23.
330. See Gallup & Hugick, supranote 328, at 24.

1999]

THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH REGULATION

down forty percent from a similar question administered in 1963.331
Americans are no farther along, however, in creating racial equality.
Nearly two-thirds of Americans believe that racial equality has been
achieved, but that number has been static since 1978.332 More importandy, many Americans, particularly white Americans, have declared
the civil rights crusade complete and express little willingness to address the problems faced by black Americans. The Gallup Poll's
numbers show as much. Despite evidence to the contrary, 333 "[l]arge

majorities [of Americans] think blacks now have the same opportunities as whites in ... obtaining jobs, housing and education ....

34

As

a result, almost two-thirds of whites oppose new civil rights laws "to
reduce discrimination against blacks." 335 Seventy-seven percent of
whites think "blacks overestimate the amount of discrimination in
America," 336 and black people top the list of groups for whom "there
has been too much attention" given to civil rights.337
The opposite is true for women. Between 1975 and 1989 there
was an increase of seventeen percent in the number of Americans who
say that men hold more privileges than women.33 ' Today, seventy-three
percent of couples say men earn more than women, and a significant
majority of Americans believe that women do not "have equal job opportunities with men."339 It is not surprising, then, that only twentynine percent of Americans think there has been too much attention
paid to the civil rights of women. 4 0
The Gallup poll's findings are born out in the scholarly results of
the National Election Study (NES). Just as Gallup found fewer Ameri331. See Gallup & Hugick, supra note 328, at 24.
332. See Gallup & Hugick, supra note 328, at 24, 28.
333. See generallyWILLIAM JuLius WILSON, TI

TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).

334. Colasanto, supranote 295, at 13.

335. Wheeler, supranote 296, at 2.
336. Wheeler, supra note 296, at 2.

337. Colasanto, supranote 295, at 15.
338. In 1975, 32% of respondents said men had more privileges, 28% said women had
more, and 31% said men and women had equal privileges. By 1989, 49% thought
that men had more privileges, 22% said women had more, and 21% said men and

women had equal privileges. See Linda DeStefano & Diane Colasanto, Unlike 1975,
Today Most Americans Think Men Have It Better, GALLup Pou. MoNTHLY, Feb.
1990, at 25, 25.

339. Again, these numbers should be contrasted with those from 1975. In 1975, respondents were equally split at 48%. Today, 42% percent of Americans "feel that women
in this country have equal job opportunities with men." 56% disagree. DeStefano &
Colasanto, supranote 338, at 27.
340. See Colasanto, supranote 295, at 15.
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cans favoring new civil rights laws for blacks, the NES saw a significant
drop between 1984 and 1994 in the percentage of Americans who believe that "the government in Washington should make every possible
effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks."" In addition, the number of Americans who believe that "the government
should not make any special effort to help minorities because they
should help themselves" jumped from thirty-three percent to fifty
percent. M 2 However, attitudes towards women's rights were tracking
the opposite direction. Between 1972 and 1994, the percentage of

Americans who oppose an "equal role" for women "in running business, industry and government" dropped from twenty-nine percent to
twelve percent.M

To say that public opinion has changed contemporaneously with
the associated legal doctrine is not, of course, the same thing as saying
that one caused the other. We know that courts are responsive to the
political and social climates in which they work,m4 but in some sense
this is a chicken-and-egg question. Do courts lead social change, or do
changing social attitudes influence the courts? This is undoubtedly a
contentious question among scholars.345 Still, I think there is good evidence to suggest that the courts were following public opinion in
upholding sexual harassment law and overturning hate speech codes.
Both the sexual harassment and hate speech decisions came shortly
after the respective changes in public opinion, and at least in the case
of speech codes, the courts were egged on by a series of editorials in
major newspapers and magazines. Averaging one every five days,3 6 it is

inconceivable to think that judges could have avoided the turn in elite
opinion, where over eighty percent of the editorials opposed the adoption of hate speech codes. 7 Even Justice Kennedy has acknowledged
that judges follow current trends.4 As one of his former clerks explains, Kennedy "constantly refer[s] to how [a decision is] going to be

341. NES, supra note 298.
342. NES, supra note 298.

343. NES, supra note 298 (illustrating how the courts have interpreted the First Amendment in response to political and social climates).
344. See generally Kloppenberg, supranote 242.
345. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 200; SCHUBERT, supra note 243.
346. Running a search on Nexis, I found 364 editorials over a five-year period beginning
in 1989.
347. A content analysis of the same editorials provides this information.
348. See Jeffirey Rosen, Annals ofLaw: The Agonizer, NEw YommRR, Nov. 11, 1996, at 82,
86.
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perceived, how the papers are going to do it, how it's going to look."" 9
Again, this is not the same as statistical proof, but with an institution
that is reluctant to acknowledge majoritarian influences, this connection alone should raise eyebrows. Perhaps it is time to reconsider the
courts' treatment of sexual harassment law and collegiate speech codes.
To the courts, just as it was to the public, sexual harassment law may
have represented necessary protection for women, while hate speech
codes became synonymous with "special rights" that minorities no
longer required.
CONCLUSION

As I have said from the beginning, the point of this Article is not
to argue that any one of the alternative theories must explain the
courts' disparate treatment between sexual harassment and hate speech.
Rather, I am suggesting that we need to reexamine the assumed distinction between HWE claims for sexual harassment and collegiate
hate speech codes. I do not have an agenda here. I am not advocating
that we weaken sexual harassment law or that we reenact campus
speech codes. My role is that of critical observer. I hope that the reader
will take three essential points away from the Article. First, the courts
have treated similar claims differently. As drafted, the collegiate hate
speech codes were virtually identical to Tide VII's sexual harassment
law, yet the courts have upheld sexual harassment claims while ruling
hate speech codes unconstitutional. Second, the explanations proffered
by the courts, as well as other traditional legal rationales, do not adequately explain the courts' different treatment.

Finally, while several bases may seem conceivable, there is still the
nagging sense that the courts are not telling us something about their
real reasons. As a result, I think we need to step back and ask whether
there are other explanations for the courts' behavior. I.have essentially
proposed a "political" explanation, suggesting that a variety of cultural
and social factors influenced the courts to create and reject various legal rights. In particular, I have argued that the courts' attitudes toward
gender and' racial protection governed these cases. I may be wrong.
After all, this Article takes a new approach. However, we cannot ignore
the fact that the courts have created two separate approaches for claims

349. Rosen, supra note 348, at 86.
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that should have been treated similarly. It is not enough to say that
sexual harassment law is constitutional and hate speech is not. The
question is why, and the courts have yet to provide us a justifiable
answer. *

